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Models of spatial competition are designed and analyzed to describe the fact that
space, by its very nature, is a source of market power. This field of research, lying at
the interface of game theory and economics, has attracted much interest because the
competitive location problem emerged as a prototype of many economic situations
involving interacting decision-makersl. In this way, location problems are related to
many aspects of competition in modern economics.
Consider for example the market for dance lessons. If one wants to take a course
of dance lessons, one's choice of school is based upon differences from school to school
in the lessons offered. The price of dance lessons is one characteristic. The other
characteristics, called non-price characteristics, include, for example, the (physical)
distance to the school, the quality of the lessons, and subjective perceptions (see
also Lancaster (1975)). Usually, the school selected is that which promises greatest
satisfaction.
Owners of dance schools, knowing that people select the school that offers greatest
satisfaction, have accordingly two means to achieve their objective, that is, to maxi-
mize profit: They may decide on prices and on non-price characteristics. These two
decisions give rise respectively to price competition and non-price competition; it is
natural to assume that the latter takes place before the former. Non-price charac-
teristics are chosen to satisfy consumers' wishes optimally, while taking into account
any consequent effect on price competition. We may distinguish between horizontal
and vertical differentiation. Two variants of a product are said to be horizontally
differentiated when, sold at the same price, some consumers choose one variant while
lA related line of reseazch is regiona! science. Fujita (1986) and Fujita and Thisse (1995) provide
a thorough overview of literature in this field.
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others buy the alternative. Two variants are vertically differentiated when, sold at the
same price, all consumers purchase the same variant (see Shaked and Sutton (1982)).
Gabszewicz and Thisse (1992) indicate how the nature of competition varies under
the two types of differentiation.
In this monograph, we look both at price competition and non-price competition.
Except for the model in the last chapter, it is assumed that each consumer is charged
the same price, so there is no price discrimination. Only horizontal differentiation
is considered in the case of non-price competition. Analysis of price competition
provides insights into the functioning of differentiated goods markets or, in other
words, into the prices that result in this type of market. The analysis of non-price
competition provides insights into the degree of difFerentiatíon that arises when taking
into account the consequent effect on price competition.
Returning to the market for dance lessons, we may ask the following questions.
What happens if customers are willing to pay only a certain amount for lessons? If the
dance schools are located relatively far away from each other, will local monopolies
arise? What happens if one school is located closer to the majority of the people
than the others? What happens if customers put different valuations on competing
dance lessons, because perhaps the quality of lessons differs or is perceived to be
different? We also analyse how each of these situations influences the choice of non-
price characteristics.
In order to take dance lessons, a dance partner is needed. Usually, there are
separate lessons for married and unmarried couples, and for teenagers and single
people. If a single person wants lessons, he or she has the problem of finding a dance
partner of the opposite sex. Since a dance school implicitly provides a matching
service, it should clearly try to equalize the numbers of male and female customers.
So if, for example, there is a shortage of women it may be optimal to discriminate
in prices and offer free lessons for women. One of the questions we address in this
monograph is how price competition is influenced by this so-called bidateral matching2.
The above, and related, questions are studied in the coherent framework of a stage
game with observed actions. A stage game is a non-cooperative game, which means
that no binding agreements can be made. The first studies of 'games' in economics
literature are the papers by Cournot (1838) and Bertrand (1883) on pricing and pro-
duction in oligopolistic markets. The idea of a general theory of games was introduced
by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), who proposed that most economic issues
ZR.oth and Sotomayor (1990) provides a nice overview of the results on bilateral matching in a
cooperative framework.
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should be analyzed as games. Since then game theory has proved to be a successful
tool to study economic problems (for example, see van Damme (1995)).
The study of differentiated goods markets by means of a stage game was initiated
by Hotelling (1929). The players are firms, the strategies are prices and locations, and
the payoffs are profit functions. In the next section we discuss the Hotelling (1929)
model in more detail, because it is the cornerstone of much of the argument in this
monograph.
1.1 Hotelling's model of spatial competition
In Hotelling's (1929) model there is a continuum of consumers distributed uniformly
along a line segment. Also, there are two firms. The firms play a two-stage location-
then-price game. In the first stage of the game firms choose their locations and in the
second stage the firms compete in prices, from these fixed locations. Each consumer
buys one unit of mutually exclusive goods from the firm with the lowest overall price,
which is the sum of the mill price and the cost of shipping the product to the consumer.
Hotelling assumed this transportation cost to be linear in distance. However, as shown
by d'Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979), with linear transportation costs there
does not exist a price equilibrium, at least in pure strategies, if the firms' locations
are too close. Consequently, there does not exist a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
If the transportation cost is assumed to be quadratic in distance, d'Aspremont et al.
(1979) prove that there exists a unique price equilibrium for all location pairs3.
First, we briefly address the existence problem for linear transportation costs.
Next, we derive the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium for the two-stage location-
then-price game with quadratic transportation costs. The subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium for this two-stage game can be found using backward induction. In the
present context, the concept of subgame-perfection captures the idea that, when firms
select their locations in the first stage, they both anticipate the consequences of their
choices on price competition in the second stage. The optimal locations of the firms
are determined by two effects, namely a direct effect and a strategic effect (see Forges
and Thisse (1992)). By a direct effect we mean that a location closer to the centre of
population leads to a greater ability to encroach on the rival's market territory. By
3Anderson (1988) studies the existence of equilibria for the more general case that transportation
costs are linear-quadratic (with a constant term equal to zero). There, it is shown that the parameters
of the quadratic and the linear term have to satisfy very stringent conditions in order to guarantee
the existence of a price equilibrium.
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a strategic effect we mean that competition will be more severe if the firms locate
closer to each other. Indeed, if both firms locate at the same point there is Bertrand
competition with zero profits for both firms. The Nash equilibrium of the first stage
resolves this trade-off.
Given the locations and prices of the firms, we are able to determine easily the
location of the indifferent consumer, being the unique consumer for which buying
from either firm is equally costly. For all other consumers one of the firms is cheaper
than the other. Because consumers are assumed to buy from the cheapest source,
the location of the indifferent consumer determines the demand for the product of
each firm. Costs are assumed to be normalized to zero, so that the profit of a firm is
simply the product of price and demand.
First, consider the price stage. In the price stage firms choose prices to maximize
profits, given their locations. A Nash equilibrium in prices is a pair of prices such
that no firm can gain by unilateral deviation. With linear transportation costs, there
is a unique Nash equilibrium only if the distance between the firms' locations is large
enough. However, if the firms are too close, both firms have an incentive to charge a
price such that the other firm is inactive and hence there is no price equilibrium. The
non-existence of a price equilibrium is caused by the non-quasi-concavity of the profit
function (see Dasgupta and Maskin (1986)). In other words, if the firms are located
too close to each other, the positive demand effect dominates the negative price effect.
If the distance between the firms is large enough, profits are quasi-concave and the
price effect dominates. With quadratic transportation costs, there exists a unique
Nash equilibrium in prices for all possible locations of firms.
Next, consider the location stage. Given the price equilibrium in case of quadratic
transportation costs, we are able to analyse the firms' location decisions in full detail.
Assume that firm 1 locates to the left of firm 2, which ignores difficulties arising from
the coordination problem the firms face4. A Nash equilibrium in locations is a pair of
locations such that, given the equilibrium prices in the second stage, no firm can gain
by unilateral deviation. In choosing their locations the firms take into account the
effect their choices have on price competition. If transportation costs are quadratic
there is a unique equilibrium in locations in which firms locate outside the intervals.
4For a detailed discussion on this problem see Bester, de Palma, Leininget, von Thadden, and
Thomas (1991), which shows that there will be less differentiation in this case, because each firm
has a positive probability of ending "left to the middle".
SIf one restricts the firms to locate inside the interval, the equilibrium locations aze exactly the
two endpoints of the line segment.
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A subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium for the two-stage location-then-price game is
therefore simply a pair of locations and a pair of prices such that, given equilibrium
prices in the second stage, no firm can gain by unilaterally changing its location, and
no firm can gain by unilaterally changing its price for any pair of locations.
1.2 Principles of differentiation
Hotelling's (1929) result that price competition between oligopolistic firms would
result in consumers being offered products with 'an excessive sameness' has become
known as the principle of minimum differentiation. This principle had been widely
used, so the conclusion of d'Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) that this result
was invalid was quite a shock. Subsequent research tried to understand the reason
the principle was no longer valid, as well as find conditions to restore it. Different
approaches have been developed, which can be divided into those using one- and those
using two-dimensinal models.
The following pertain to models of one dimension.
First, we have the maximum di,f,jrerentiation result due to d'Aspremont, Gabszewicz
and Thisse (1979) in case of quadratic transportation costs. If firms are allowed to
locate outside the interval it is sometimes called excessive differentiation (see Tirole
(1988)). Gabszewicz and Thisse (1992) shows, for example, that transportation costs
should be convex enough in order to guarantee the existence of a price equilibrium
for all location pairs.
Secondly, by generalizing the utility function used by Hotelling (1929), Econo-
mides (1986) shows that the degree of differentiation depends on the curvature of the
transportation cost function. The principle of minimum differentiation does not hold
for a family of utility functions having as a special case Hotelling's original utility
function. Furthermore, the maximum differentiation result holds only if transporta-
tion costs are convex enough.
Thirdly, by generalizing the consumers distribution function, Neven (1986) and
Tabuchi and Thisse (1995), amongst others, show that the degree of differentiation
depends on the specification of the distribution function.
Fourthly, following Eaton and Lipsey (1975), a no-mill-price-undercutting assump-
tion may be used (see Novshek (1980)). This means that each firm takes its com-
petitor's price as given and refrains from setting a price that would eliminate the
competitor's product. An alternative avoiding-price-war assumption is proposed in
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Hamilton and Thisse (1985), which shows that over the domain of prices implied by
this behavioral constraint, an equilibrium exists for all location pairs in Hotelling's
model. In the location stage, the two firms establish themselves at their efficient
locations. A related model is that of Friedman and Thisse (1993), describing the
equilibrium behavior in a model with a countably infinite succession of time periods.
If equilibrium behavior is such as to have firms collusively arrange a trigger strategy
equilibrium in prices, and select their locations knowing that a particular such trigger
strategy price equilibrium will ensue, the minimum differentiation result applies.
Fifthly, a different approach to the problem is the probabilistic one (for example,
see de Palma, Ginsburgh, Papageorgiou, and Thisse (1985) or Anderson, de Palma,
and Thisse (1992)). The point of departure is to recognize the fact that firms cannot
determine a priori differences in consumers' tastes, so that they endow each consumer
with a probabilistic choice rule. At the aggregate level, it is assumed that the prob-
ability functions predict the actual frequencies perfectly well. In this way, consumer
demand is smoothly distributed between firms which, as a result, gives rise to over-
lapping market areas. It is shown that the principle of minimum differentiation holds
when the degree of heterogeneity is sufficiently large. An alternative probabilistic
approach is to consider mixed strategies. According to Osborne and Pitchik (1987),
it turns out that, under appropriate conditions, a mixed strategy equilibrium can be
viewed as a pure strategy equilibrium in a game of incomplete information.
Several models in two dimensions have also been developed to address the question
of differentiation.
First, Eaton and Lipsey (1975) look at equilibrium existence in a two-dimensional
model where there is no price competition, but only competition in location in a two-
dimensional space. They show that the principle of minimal differentiation occurs
only in case there are two firmss.
Secondly, by having consumers distributed uniformly not only over geographi-
cal space, but also with respect to transportation cost, Garella and Martinez-Giralt
(1992) prove that the simultaneous price-location Nash equilibrium converges to the
minimum differentiation outcome of Hotelling when the difference in transportation
costs disappears.
Thirdly, there is a line of research considering models encompassing both vertical
and horizontal differentiation (see Neven and Thisse (1990) and Irmen and Thisse
(1995), amongst others), where it is assumed that firms are able to choose simulta-
sThe spatial approach to electoral competition is a nice example of the absence of price compe-
tition (see Shepsle (1991)).
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neously the horizontal as well as vertical characteristics of their product. The result
obtained is that firms choose maximum differentiation along one of the characteristics
and minimum differentiation along the other.
All the approaches mentioned are closely related to the original Hotelling (1929)
model. In a differentiated goods market also several other lines of research deserve
attention. We here list only a few of the most significant.
The competition of firms by discriminatory pricing is studied by Lederer and
Hurter (1986). Eiselt (1991) considers the situation where one firm uses discrimina-
tory pricing and the other firm uses mill pricing. Kats (1987) considers imperfect
discriminatory pricing, by allowing firms to charge only up to a certain number of
different prices.
The competition of firms in a multi-product situation is studied by Stahl (1982)
and Quinzii and Thisse (1990). Due to demand externalities, clustering of firms may
occur. Another form of externality in differentiated goods markets is congestion. With
congestion the perception of the characteristics of a product depends on the number
of buyers of that product as well as on the number of buyers of close substitutes.
Furth (1995), for example, looks at the congestion efFects in a vertically differentiated
market.
1.3 Outline of the monograph
In this monograph we discuss the aspects of price competition and of non-price com-
petition in a differentiated goods market. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 are generalizations of
the linear Hotelling (1929) model of spatial competition, and these chapters address
questions of both price and non-price competition. The Chapters 5 and 6 are gener-
alizations of the circular Salop (1979) model of spatial price competition, and these
chapters address the question of price competition only. Because of the absence of
endpoints, the question of non-price competition is less interesting in this case. From
Kats (1995) we know that a symmetric location of firms constitutes an equilibrium,
which is unique if transportation cost is quadratic, but not if it is linear.
In the standard linear model with two firms there is one type of consumer, dis-
tributed uniformly along a line segment and having an 'infinite' willingness to pay or
reservation price for the product. Consumers buy the product from the firm that has
the lowest overall price. Following d'Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979), in
the linear model we assume the transportation cost to be quadratic in distance.
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The model of Chapter 2 differs from the standard linear model with respect to
the reservation price. In this model, consumers have a finite reservation price for the
product. If the reservation price is high enough, we get the competitive situation as
in the standard linear model. If the reservation price is very low, we end up with
local monopolies. In equilibrium, the degree of differentiation is non-decreasing in
the reservation price. The degree of differentiation is never minimal, because price
competition then drives profits down too much. If the reservation price is relatively
high, we get the maximum differentiation result of d'Aspremont, Gabszewicz and
Thisse (1979).
The model of Chapter 3 differs from the standard linear model with respect to the
distribution of the consumers. Here, consumers are distributed piecewise uniforraly
along a line segment. We endow all firms with beliefs about the location of the in-
different consumer and look at the game where firms maximize the corresponding
expected profit. Following Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti (1989), we introduce
the psychological equilibrium concept for this type of game, and show that, in equi-
librium, the indifferent consumer is exactly the median consumer. For equilibrium,
beliefs have to be consistent, that is, expected and realized profit are the same. It
should be noted that in general the psychological equilibrium is not an equilibrium
for the game without beliefs.
In Chapter 4, we have two types of consumers, each being distributed uniformly
along a line segment. These consumers have an 'infinite' willingness to pay. Both
types of consumers may put a different valuation on the same product from different
firms, or in other words, the consumers are difFerentiated vertically. The unit trans-
portation cost is the same for both types. Firms, given locations, compete in price
for two subsequent periods of time. Due to changes in the demand side over time,
firms choose locations to maximize the discounted sum of their per period profits. We
discuss in detail how this changes firms' locations.
In the standard circular model with a finite number of firms, there is one type
of consumer, distributed uniformly along a circle and having an 'infinite' reservation
price for the product. Consumers buy the product from the firm that has the lowest
overall price. In the models of Chapters 5 and 6, there are two types of consumers,
each being distributed uniformly along the circle.
The model of Chapter 5 can be seen as the circular equivalent of the model in
Chapter 4. In Chapter 5 consumers may either be vertically differentiated or have
finite reservation prices. The unit transportation cost may differ for different types
of consumers. Among other things, we show that the familiar result that free entry
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is characterized by too many firms compared to the social optimum may be invalid if
the unit transportation cost differs between the two types of consumers. Competition
for one type of consumers may drive prices and demands down too much, so that the
fixed costs cannot be covered at the social optimum.
In Chapter 6, we use the circular model to describe a bilateral matching market.
Firms play the role of rnatch rrcakers or, more general, institutions, who make trade
possible by bringing two market-sides together. The match makers charge commission
fees for this service. In equilibrium, demand and supply must be equal. If there is
excess demand, the buyers' fee is higher, and if there is excess supply, the sellers'
fee is higher. Because of price competition, free-riding may occur, that is, one of the
market sides is served for free.
1.4 Preliminaries on two-stage games with ob-
served actions
In this section we develop the formalism for modeling extensive form games and
discuss the solution concept of subgame-perfection. We consider the class of two-
stage games with observed actions7. These games have two stages, in which, first,
in each stage every player knows all the actions taken by any player at any previous
stage, and, second, players move simultaneously in each stage. We say that players
move simultaneously in a stage if each player chooses his action in that stage without
knowing the action of any other player in the same stage.
Let 1-{1, ..., n} be the set of n players in the two-stage game G. In the first
stage of G, each player i E I simultaneously chooses actions from the choice set
A; (ho), where ho - 0 is the history at the start of the game. At the end of each
stage, all players observe the actions chosen in that stage. Let al -(ai, ..., an) be
the action profile in stage 1, with ai E A; (ho) the action taken by player i E I in this
stage. We define hl, the history at the start of the second stage or at the end of the
first stage, to be the action in the previous period, i.e. h' - a' given that ho - 0. At
the beginning of stage 2, the players know history hl. In general, the actions player
i E 1 has avaílable in stage 2 depend on what has happened previously, so we let
A?(hl) denote the possible second-stage actions when the history is hl. In the second
stage of a two-stage game, each player i E I simultaneously chooses actions from
'For a discussion of the more general class of mulii-stage games see, for example, Fudenberg and
Tirole (1991) and Kreps (1990).
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the choice set A?(hr), where hr is the history at the start of the second stage. Let
a2 -(ai, .. ., an ) be the action profile in stage 2. In case of a two-stage location-then-
price game the players are firms, the actions in the first stage are locations and the
actions in the second stage are prices. We define h2, the history at the end of stage 2,
to be the sequence of actions in the previous two periods, hZ -(ar, az). Since each h2
by definition describes an entire sequence of actions from the beginning of the game
on, the set of all possible histories at the end of stage 2 is the same as the set of all
possible outcomes when the game is played.
In this setting a pure strategy for player i E I is sirnply a contingent plan of how
to play in each stage k E If -{1,2} for every possible history hk-r. If we let Hk-r
denote the set of all histories at stage k, and
A;`(Hk-r) - U Ak(hk-r), k E IC,
hk-~ENk-~
then a pure strategy for player i E 1 is a set of maps s; -{s~ , s? }, where each s;`,
k E Ií, maps Hk-~ into the set of player i's feasible actions A;(Hk-r). The sequence
of action profiles generated by such strategies are found then as follows: The action
profile is ar - sl(ho) in stage 1 and the action profile is a2 - sz(hr) in stage 2.
Because hr - ar, the pair (al,a2) is called the path of the strategy profile. Since
a terminal history represents an entire sequence of play, we can represent player i's
payoff or profit as a function II; : HZ ~--~ 1R.
Because we can assign an outcome in Hz to each strategy profile, and a payoff
vector to each outcome, we are able now to compute the payoff for any strategy
profile. In this context, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile such
that, given the strategy of one player, no other player can do better with a different
strategy8. It is well known that certain Nash equilibria rely on "empty threats" of
suboptimal play at histories off the equilibrium path.
The two-stage location-then-price game is a game of "almost perfect" informa-
tion, because such a game introduces simultaneity only within a period (see Tirole
(1988)). Given this fact, how should a player forecast the second-stage price choice
of its opponent? In the spirit of equilibrium analysis, a natural conjecture is that the
second-stage price choices will be those of a Nash equilibrium for the existant loca-
tions. In other words, each history hr generates a simultaneous-move game between
sThis equilibrium is called after Nash (1950), who proposed strategy profiles to be such that each
player's strategy is an optimal response to the other player's strategies. The Nash equilibrium is in
fact a generalization of the equilibria studied in Bertrand (1883) and Cournot (1838).
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the two players, and the players conjecture that play in this game will correspond to
a Nash equilibrium for the payoffs prevailing under h'. This is exactly the idea of
Selten (1965, 1975), called subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Defining subgame-perfection requires a few preliminary steps. First, since all
players know the history hk-1 of moves before stage k E lí , we may consider the
game from stage k on with history hk-' as a game in íts own right, which we denote
G(hk-1). To define the payoff functions for this game, note that if the action profiles
in stages 1 and 2 are al and a~ respectively, the history at the end of stage 2 will
be h2 -(a', a2) and so the payoffs will be II;(h2) for player i E I. For player i E I,
strategies in G(hk-') are simply maps from the set of histories to the set of actions,
where the only histories we need to consider are those consistent with hk-'. So now
we can speak of the Nash equilibria of the stage game G(hk-'), k E K.
Moreover, any strategy profile s-(sl, sz) of the game G induces a strategy profile
s ~ hk-1 on any stage game G(hk-1), k E lí, in the following way. For each player
i E I, s; ~ hk-' is the restriction of s; to the histories consistent with hk-', k E Ií.
Definition 1.4.1 A strategy profile s of a two-stage game G with observed actions is
a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium if, for every hk-' E Hk-1, k E Ií, the restriction
s ~ hk-1 to the game G(hk-1) is a Nash equilibrium of G(hk-1)
The subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium separates the "reasonable" Nash equilibria
from the "unreasonable" ones (see Selten (1965)). In two-stage games with observed
actions, subgame-perfection requires that the restrictíons of the strategy profile yield
a Nash equilibrium from the start of each stage for any history up to that stage.
Because the game has a fixed finite number of stages, we are able to characterize the
subgame-perfect Nash equilibria using backward induction. The strategies in the last
stage must be a Nash equilibrium of the corresponding one-shot simultaneous-move
game, and for each history ht we replace the last stage by one of its Nash-equilibrium
payoffs. By repeating this step, we reach the first stage, with history ho. From this
we can easily derive the subgame-perfect Nash equilibria.
Chapter 2
The Location Model with
Reservation Prices
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we analyze a variant of the standard Hotelling (1929) model of spatial
competition where firms first choose locations along the line and then, given these
locations, compete in prices. Consumers have a finite reservation price, specifying
how much they are willing to pay for the commodity offered by the firms. This idea
of introducing a finite reservation price goes back to Lerner and Singer (1937) and
5mithies (1941). Each consumer buys at most one unit of the mutually exclusive
commodities. If a consumer buys the product, he buys from the firm that offers the
highest indirect utility. The indirect utility function of a consumer incorporates both
transportation costs and the reservation price. Firms are aware of the reservation price
and take into account the impact of their location decisions on their profits. To make
the analysis tractable we assume that firms coordinate on their location choices, which
implies that firms coordinate on the degree of differentiation. If the reservation price
is relatively high, the maximum differentiation result of d'Aspremont, Gabszewicz
and Thisse (1979) is obtained. If, however, the reservation price is relatively low,
the degree of differentiation is lower. On the other hand, there cannot be minimal
differentiation, because then price competition would drive profits down too much.
We show that there exists a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the
location-then-price game if the reservation price is high enough. In that case the
degree of differentiation is non-decreasing in the reservation price, because differenti-
ation relaxes price competition. If the reservation price is lower, there is a continuum
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of subgame perfect Nash equilibria due to the fact that firms can act as local monop-
olists and the other firm's location choice becomes of less importance. However, all
equilibria yield the same profit.
In equilibrium the degree of differentiation between the firms is non-decreasing in
the reservation price. Economides (1984) already indicates maximal 'profitable' dif-
ferentiation in the original Hotelling model with linear transportation costs, whereas
we consider the model with quadratic transportation costs. Due to the fact that in
case of linear transportation costs, the existence of a price equilibrium is not guaran-
teed for all location pairs, the analysis then has to be restricted to the local monopoly
situation (see also Friedman (1983)). In case of quadratic transportation costs, how-
ever, we are able to analyze both the local monopoly situation and the competitive
situation.
In general the firms can do better than locate at the end points of the line as
in Boyer and Moreaux (1993). As long as there are consumers at the edges of the
markets that do not buy the product, firms have an incentive to move towards the
edges.
This chapter is based on Webers (1996a) and is organized as follows. In Section
2 the location-then-price game with reservation prices is formulated. 5ection 3 and
Section 4 discuss the price stage and the location stage, respectively. In 5ection
5 the main result is stated, being the existence of a unique subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium for the location-then-price game if the reservation price is high enough,
and otherwise there exists a continuum of subgame perfect Nash equilibria. In Section
6 we look at the situation where the firms are located at the endpoints of the line, in
more detail. The proofs are gathered in Section 7.
2.2 The model
There is a continuum of consumers distributed uniformly with density one along the
line segment [0,1]. Disposable income for the consumers to buy one unit of a certain
commodity is given by some fixed number p E 1R~. The number p will be referred to
as the reservation price and specifies how much the consumers are willing to pay for
the product. There are two firms on the market, denoted firm 1 and firm 2. Firm
i E I-{1,2} locates at ~; along the real line and sells the commodity at price
p; E P-[0,p]. It is clear that a firm will not charge a price higher than p, because
then demand for the commodity of this firm is always zero. We assume that firm 1
locates to the left of firm 2.
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Assumption 2.2.1 Firm 1 locates to the left of firm 2, i.e., xl C x2.
To make the analysis tractable we furthermore assume that both firms locate sym-
metrically, which includes the benchmark case xl - 1- x2 - 0, originally considered
by Boyer and Moreaux (1993). Essentially this assumption means that, in the first
stage, firms coordinate on the degree of differentiation.
Assumption 2.2.2 Firm 1 and firm 2 locate symmetrically, i.e., xl - 1- x2.
If a consumer buys one unit of the commodity from firm i E I at price p; E P the
indirect utility is given by
V(xf xi,pi) - ~- ili - t(x, xi)e (2.2.1)
where x is the consumer's location in the unit interval. The number t(x,x;) is the
transportation cost for shipping the product of firm i to this consumer's location.
We assume this transportation cost to be quadratic in distance with unit cost equal
to one, i.e., t(x,x;) -(x - x;)2. Each consumer buys from the firm that offers the
highest non-negative indirect utility. A consumer does not buy if he is offered a
negative indirect utility by both firms. The market area of the product of firm i E I
at given locations xl and x2 and prices pl E P and p2 E P is therefore given by
Mi(xlix2i~li~2) -~~ E~~ill I Vi(xixiiili) ~ 172ax1~~v]1~~x7~~7))i ~ 2},
i.e., the set of consumers that prefer to buy the commodity from firm i.
At locations xl and x2 - 1-xl and at prices pl and p2, the demand X;(xl,pl,p2)
for the commodity of firm i E 1 is equal to
Xi(xl,Pl,Ps) - dx. (2.2.2)
M~~~,~s2,Pl,Pa)
We may distinguish three different types of indifferent consumers, namely two or less
consumers being indifferent between buying from firm 1 and not buying at all, two
or less consumers being indifferent between buying from firm 2 and not buying at
all, and, finally, a consumer being indifferent between buying from firm 1 and buying
from firm 2.
ForiEl,let
x; - xi - (P - Pi)2 (2.2.3)~
and xt - xif(P-Pi)~,
for given locations xl and x2 and prices pl and p2.
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If xi ) x2 , the location of the consumer being indifferent between buying from
firm 1 and buying from firm 2 is given by
x- xr ~ xz ~ Pz - Pi (2.2.4)2 2(xz - xl)'
being the midpoint between the firms' locations corrected for price differences. Other-
wise xi and x2 denote the locations of the consumers indifferent between not buying
at all and buying from firm 1 and firm 2, respectively. Furthermore, if xi 1 0, xi
and, if x2 C 1, x2 denote the locations of the consumers indifferent between not
buying at all and buying from firm 1 and firm 2, respectively. Notice that when there
are two consumers being indifferent between buying from a firm and not buying at
all, they are located symmetrically around the firm's location.
Given the locations xl and xz - 1- xl, at prices pt E P and pz E~, the demand
for the commodity of firm 1 can be expressed as
X~(xi,p~,Pz) -
x ifxi ~xandxi CO
x-xi ifxl lxandxi ~0
xi ifxi Gxandxi GO
xi - xi if xi G x and xl ~ 0,
(2.2.5)
and the demand for the commodity of firm 2 can be expressed as
Xz(xi~pi,pz
1-x ifxz Cxandx2 )1
x2 - x if x2 G x and xz G 1
1- x2 if x2 1 x and x2 1 1
x2 - x2 if x2 ) x and x2 G 1.
(2.2.6)
At locations xl and xz - 1- xl and at prices p1 and pz, the profit of firm i E I is
equal to
na(x~~p~,pz) - ptiXt(x~,p~,Pz). (2.2.7)
Given the locations xl and xz - 1- xl we look for a Nash equilibrium for the price
stage where the two firms simultaneously choose prices as to maximize their profit.
The price stage is solved by prices pi(xl) E 7~ and p2(xl) E P such that
~i(xi,Pi(xi),pá(xi)) ~ Pi(xi,Pi,P2(xi))
~z(xi,pi(xi),ps(xi)) ~ ~s(xi,Pi(xi),pz)
for all pl E 7~ and pz E 1~, respectively. For ease of notation, we denote
~i(xi) - 1I:(xi,pi(xi),pz(xi)), z E I.
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An equilibrium of the location stage is then given by some pair (x„ 1- xi) E 1Rz
satisfying xi G 2 and for any xl G 2
II;(xi) 1 II,'(x~) for all i E I.
A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the location-then-price game is defined
by (xl, 1- xi) and (pi(xl), p2(x1)) for all location pairs (x~, 1- x~) with xl G 2. The
corresponding equilibrium path is (xi, 1- xi) and (pi(xi),Ps(xi))-
2.3 The price stage
In this section we consider the price stage. With symmetric locations we may restrict
ourselves to the situation xl E[-4, 2~, because for xl - 1- xz --4 the degree
of differentiation is relatively maximal ( see for example Tirole (1988)). The solution
to the price stage is most easily found by looking at three different cases, because
in these three cases the structure of competition differs. First we consider the case
-4 G xl - 1- xz G 0. In this case the demands for the commodity of firm 1 and
firm 2 as expressed in equations (2.2.5) and ( 2.2.6), respectively, reduce to
X (x p P ) -
I x ifxi 7x
Sl t 'f }~
(2.3.8)t i, i, 2
and
- I 1-x ifx2 GxXz(x~,1~,,pz) 1 (2.3.9)
1- xz if x2 ~ x,
because xi C 0 and x2 ~ 1 then. It is clear that this case, which includes the result of
Boyer and Moreaux (1993) for xl - 1-xz - 0, is the easiest because of the relatively
simple demand function.
Proposition 2.3.1 Let -9 C xl - 1-xz C 0. Then, there exists a unique symmetric
Nash equilibrium (pi(xl),p2(xl)) E P x~ for the price stage given by
~- s(xi)z f sxi((xi)z ~ 3P)' if Pi C P C Pz
Pi(xi) - p~(xi) - p-(z - xi)z ~f Pz C P C Ps
1- 2x1 if P3 C p,
where pi -(xi)z, Pz - ( xi)z - 2xi -F á, Ps - 1- 2x1 f(2 - x~)z. If 0 G p G Pi,
for both firms profits are zero and a possible Nash equilibrium (pi(x~), pz(xi)) for the
price game is given by pi(x~) - p2(xl) - 0 then.
xl i x, -x
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Proof See Section 7.
It is easy to check that for p 1 pl, equilibrium prices are non-decreasing in the
reservation price p and also that the corresponding equilibrium demands are non-
decreasing in p. For p- pl the consumer located at zero is just indifferent between
buying from firm 1 and not buying at all. Equilibrium demand is equal to 0 for
O C p C pl, 2 for p~ pzi and it increases continuously from 0 to 2 for pl C p C pz.
Next we consider the case 0 G x1 - 1- xz c 4. The demands for the commodity
of firm 1 and firm 2 are given by equations (2.2.5) and (2.2.6) then, respectively.
Proposition 2.3.2 Let 0 G xl - 1- xz G 4. Then, there exists a unique symmetric
Nash equilibrium (pi(xl), p2(xl)) E P x P for the price stage given by
~3 zf 0 ~ p C Pl
P-(xl)z zf Pi c P C Pz
pi(xi) - Pz(xi) - ~- 9(xi)z ~ sxi((xi)z ~- 3P)2 z.i Pz C P C Ps
p-(2 - xi)z zf Ps C P ~ Pa
1- 2x1 if P4 C p,
where pi - 3(xi)z, Pz - 5(xi)z, Ps -(xi)z - 2x1 -~- 4, Pa - 1- 2x1 f(2 - xl)z.
Proof See Section 7.
Again equilibrium prices are non-decreasing in the reservation price p and also
the corresponding equilibrium demands are non-decreasing in p. Equilibrium demand
increases continuously from 0 to 2x1 for 0 G p C pl, it is equal to 2x1 for pl C p G pzi
it increases continuously from 2x1 to 2 for pz C p G p3, and it is equal to 2 for p? p3.
In equilibrium the situation in which both xi ~ x2 and xi 1 0 or x2 G 1 cannot
occur. If equilibrium prices are relatively so low that xi 1 x2 , then it holds that
xi GOandx2 )1. -
Finally we consider the case 4 C xl - 1-xz C 2. The demands for the commodity
of firm 1 and firm 2 are given again by equations (2.2.5) and (2.2.6), respectively.
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Proposition 2.3.3 Let 4 G xr - 1- x2 C 2. Then, there exists a unique symmetric
Nash equilibrium (pl(xl), p2(xl)) E 7~ x 7~ for the price stage given by
~
3 Zf ~ C p ~ PI
p-(2 - xl)2 if Pi C P C Pa
pi(xi) - p2(xl) - p- (z f 2x1 - 1)2 if Pa G P C Ps
P-(xi)2 zf Ps C P G Pa
1- 2x1 if Pa C P,
where z - 2( p}2i13 2x'i2 ) 2 cos( 3) with q, E [0, ~r] satisfying the condition cos(~) -
- 1-2' 3(P}2~'32x'~Z)-2 pl - 3(2 - xl)2, p2 is the unique value of p for which,
z- 2- 3x1i p3 is the unique value of p for which z- 1- x1i p4 - 1- 2x1 f(xl )2.
Proof See Section 7.
One can check that in Proposition 2.3.3 it holds that p2 - p3 - 48 for xl -
1- x2 - 4. Contrary to the previous two cases, equilibrium prices may be decreasing
now in the reservation price for pz G p G p3. The reason is that price competition may
be increasing in the reservation price, because the firms are located 'too' close. The
equilibrium demands, however, are non-decreasing in the reservation prices. Equilib-
rium demand increases continuously from 0 to 1- 2x~ for O C p C pl, it is equal to
1- 2x1 for pl G p G p2i it increases continuously from 1- 2x1 to z for p2 G p C p3i
and it is equal to 2 for p 1 p3.
As we know from Economides (1984) and Boyer and Moreaux (1993) there also
may exist asymmetric equilibria in case the local monopoly situation and the com-
petitive situation are touching, i.e., xi - x- x2 .
Lemma 2.3.4 Let -á G xl - 1- x2 G 2. Then, there are no asymmetric Nash
equilibria for the price stage, unless the local monopoly situation and the competitive
situation are touching. In the situation of touching, there exists a continuum of Nash
equilibria. The symmetric solution in this situation is pi(xl) - p2(xl) - p-(2 -xl)2.
Proof
In the situation of touching the reaction functions, when intersecting, are in fact
overlapping. For given p and xl, the profit maximizing price for firm i~ j E I is
given then by
pt(pi) - p - (1 - 2xi - (P - pi)~)~.
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Because p; (p~(p;)) - p; the two reaction functions are overlapping, which proves the
existence of a continuum of Nash equilibria. It is easy to see then that pi(xl) -
p2(~1) - p-(2 -x~)2 is the unique symmetric solution. For the strict local monopoly
situation and competitive situation it is obvious that there do not exist asymmetric
equilibria.
The question arises, which 'touching' equilibrium is going to be picked up by
the competitors. Symmetry and Harsanyi's (1975) tracing procedure suggest equal
Nash equilibrium prices for both firms. Following Economides (1984) we pick up the
symmetric Nash equilibrium as 'the' Nash equilibrium.
2.4 The location stage
In this section we look at the location stage. Given the (symmetric) equilibrium prices
in the price stage we determine the optimal locations in each of the three cases for all
possible values of the reservation price. In Section 5 then, we combine the three cases
in order to determine the subgame perfect Nash equilibria for the location-then-price
game.
Proposition 2.4.1 Svppose the location choice of firm 1 is restricted to -á C~1 -
Then, the optimal locations for the location stage are given by
0 if 0 C p C
- 2-(p~I)i if 4 C p G
1 33





Proof See Section 7.
In case - 4 C xl - 1- x2 C 0, the degree of horizontal differentiation is non-
decreasing in the reservation price. When the reservation price is relatively low,
the horizontal differentiation is relatively minimal, because of the demand effect.
When the reservation price is relatively high, the horizontal differentiation is relatively
maximal, because of the price effect. When the reservation price is intermediate,
horizontal differentiation is increasing in the reservation price in order to soften price
competition.
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At the locations specified in Proposition 2.4.1, demand equals (3)2 for 0 G p G 4
and 2 otherwise. The corresponding prices are ~ for 0 G p C 4, p- 9 for 4 G p G 4,
2(p f l) z- 2 for 4 G p C is , and z for p~ 16 . -
Proposition 2.4.2 Suppose the locatíon choice of firm 1 is restricted to 0 G xl -
1- x2 G 9. Then, the optimal locations for the location stage are given by -
0 if sa
andbyxi-l-x2E[(3)~,4] ifOGpG
Proof See Section 7.
3
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G p G 9
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G p G 4
G P,
In case 0 G xl - 1- x2 G á, the degree of horizontal differentiation is non-
decreasing in the reservation price. When the reservation price is relatively low,
the horizontal differentiation is relatively minimal, because of the demand effect.
When the reservation price is relatively high, the horizontal differentiation is relatively
maximal, because of the price effect. When the reservation price is intermediate,
horizontal differentiation is increasing in the reservation price in order to soften price
competition.
At the locations specified in Proposition 2.4.2, demand equals 2(3)z for 0 G p G 16
and 2 otherwise. The corresponding prices are ~ for 0 G p G ls, p- ls for ls ~ p~ ls ~
2(p ~ 1)2- 2 for 16 G p G 4, and 1 for p~ 4. -
Proposition 2.4.3 Let 4 G xl - 1- xZ G z. Then, the optimal locations for the
~
location stage are given by xi - 1-x2 - á if p 1 16, and by xi - 1-x2 E[4, 2-(3)2]
ifOGpG 16.
Proof See Section 7.
In case 4 G xl - 1- xz G 2 , the degree of horizontal differentiation again is
non-decreasing in the reservation price. When the reservation price is relatively high,
horizontal differentiation is relatively maximal in order to soften price competition.
At the locations specified in Proposition 2.4.3, demand equals 2( 3)~ for 0 G p C 6
and 2 otherwise. The corresponding prices are ~ for 0 G p C ls ~ p- is for ls ~ p~ ls ~
and 2 for p) 16. -
1 f 3
4 Z 16
- 2 - (p ~ 1)z íf ls
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2.5 Subgame perfect Nash equilibria
In the sequel, the game in which firms first choose locations and then compete in prices
is referred to as G. In the previous two sections we have derived all the ingredients
to prove the following two theorems.
Theorem 2.5.1 For 0 C p G 16, there is a continuum of subgame perfect Nash
equilibria for the game G. In equilibrium the firms' locations are given by ~i -
1 -.ZZ E ~(3)~, 2 - ( 3)~~'
Proof See Section 7.
When the reservation price is low enough, we are in a local monopoly situation.
The two firms have some freedom in their location choices. For equilibrium it is only
required that the firms do not locate too close to each other on the one hand and
do not locate too close to the endpoints on the other hand. Indeed, when the firms
locate too close to each other, competition drives profits down. When the firms locate
too close to the endpoints, demand decreases. In equilibrium, for all location choices
profits are the same and are equal to the local monopoly profit 4( 3) 2.
Theorem 2.5.2 For p) 16, there is a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for
the game G. In equilibrium firms' locations are given by
21-1-2y




















When the reservation price is relatively high, we are in a situation of competition.
The degree of differentiation is non-decreasing in the reservation price. Firms will not
locate too close because then competition drives profits down too much. In contrast
to the previous situation, firms will locate close to the endpoints and possibly outside
the interval when the reservation price is relatively very high. The reason is that this
relaxes price competition.
The following corollary states the equilibrium outcome or path. The proof follows
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Corollary 2.5.3 The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome for the game G is
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Equilibrium profit II' for both firms as a function of p equals 4(3)~ for 0 C p C 16,
i(p- ls) for 16 C p C 16, (p-~ 1)z - 1 for 16 C p G I6, and 4 for p 1 is. Equilibrium






Figure 2.1: Equilibrium locations as a function of the reservation price p.
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Figure 2.2: Equilibrium profits as a function of the reservation price p.
2.6 A special case
In this section we look at the situation where both firms choose as location the two
endpoints of the unit interval, i.e., xl - 1- x2 - 0, in more detail. First we describe
the price reaction functions.
Proposition 2.6.1 Suppose the firms choose xl - 1-~2 - 0. For given reservation
price p E 1R~ the price reaction function of firrrc i E I as a function of price p~ E P
of firm j~ i is given by p;(p~) -
iL
2 Zf ~ C p~ C p~
p~ - 1 f 2(min{3, p} - p~)~ if p~ G p~ C p~
max {~, p~ - 1} áf p~ C p~ G p,
where
0 if 0 ~
p~- -5~-4(p-~1)~ if 16 C
3 if 3 C
and
~- I-I- 2(s)' if ~ c p
P~- 3 if 3 G P
c 3
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Proof See Section 7.
It is easily checked that the price reaction function of firm i~ j E I is continuous
in p;. Moreover, in case 0 C p G 3, p;(p;) is linearly increasing for relatively low
values of p;, constant for relatively high values of p;, and decreasing and concave
for intermediate values of p~. More precisely, in this case the prices are strategic
complements for 0 G p; G p;, strategic substitutes for p; C p; C p;, and strategically
independent for p; G p; G p. Note that in case p~ 3 prices are strategic complements,
because then p;(p;) - p; - 1 for p; C p; C p and furthermore p; - p;.
From the price reaction functions we get the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium
if 0 G p G 9
if 4 C p C 9
i f 4 C p,
pi-Pz- P-á
1
which also follows directly from Proposition 2.3.1.
Equilibrium profits II' for both firms as a function of p in case xl - 1- x2 - 0
are equal to
2(3)z 1{ ~ C p C 4
1 1 3 5
E~ - z(P - 4) if 4 G p C 4
2 if 4 C p.
These profits are drawn in Figure 2.3. From Figures 2.2 and 2.3 we see that for
any given reservation price p equilibrium profits in case firms choose for the end-
points are at most equal to the equilibrium profits in case firms choose their locations
strategically. Equal profits only occur for p- 0 and p- q. For these values of the
reservation price, xl - 1 - xZ - 0 is indeed the optimal location choice.
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Figure 2.3: Equilibrium profits in case xl - 1- x2 - 0.
2.7 Proofs
p
Proof of Proposition 2.3.1 Let -4 G xl - 1- x2 G 0. Firm i E I wants to
maximize its profit p;X;(xl, pl, p2), where X;(xl, pl, p2) is given by equations (2.3.8)
and (2.3.9). A price equilibrium with xi 1 x and xz ~ x or with xi G x and
x2 G x cannot exist because it must hold that either xi G x G x2 or x2 G x G xi .
But then a price equilibrium is a pair of prices (pl,p2) such that plx and p2(1 - x)
are maximal in case xz G xi and such that plxi and p2(1 - x2 ) are maximal in
case xi G x2 . For p ~ 1- 2x1 f(2 - xl)2 this yields the competitive outcome
pi(xl) - p`2(xl) - 1- 2x1. For (xl)2 - 2x1 f á G p G 1- 2x1 ~ (2 - xl)2 we have
the boundary solution pi(xl) - pz(xl) - p-(2 - xl)2 with per firm demand equal
to 2. For ( xl)2 G p C ( xl)2 - 2x1 ~- 4 we have the one-sided local monopoly outcome
pi(xl) - p2(xl) - ~-9(xl)2-{-9x1((xl)2-}-3p)Z. Finally, forp G(xl)2 thereservation
prices are relatively too low to have the firms in the market. For any price in the
interval [0,p] profits are zero. Hence, pi(xl) - p'Z(xl) - 0 yields a Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2.3.2 Let 0 G xl - 1- x2 c 4. Firm i wants to maximize
its profit p;X;(xl,pl,p2), where X;(xl,pl,p2) is given by equations (2.2.5) and ( 2.2.6).
Similar as in the proof of Proposition 2.3.1 a price equilibrium is a pair of prices such
that plx and p2(1 - x) are maximal in case x2 G xi , xi G 0, x2 ~ 1. In case
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xi G xZ , xi G 0, x2 ] 1 prices are such that plxi and p2(1 - x2 ) are maximal.
Finally, in case xi G x2 , xi ) 0, x2 G 1 prices are such that pl(xi - xi ) and
p2(xZ - xz ) are maximal. The case x2 G xi , xi ~ 0, x2 G 1 cannot occur because
then xl 1 z max{x, 1- x} which contradicts 0 c xt c 4. For p? 1- 2x1 f( 2- xl )2
this yields the competitive outcome pl(x1) - p2(xl) - 1-2x1. For (xl)2 -2x1 f 4 G
p G 1-2x1 ~-(2 -xl)2 we have the boundary solution pi(xl) - p2(xl) - p- (2 -xr)2
with per firm demand equal to 2. For 5(xl)2 G p G(xl)2 - 2x1 -}- 9 we have the
one-sided local monopoly outcome pi(x1) - p2(x1) - 3- y(xl)2 -}- yxl((xl)2 -}- 3p)2.
For 3(xl)2 G p G 5(xl)2 we have the boundary solution pl(xl) - p2(xl) - p-(xl)2
with per firm demand equal to 2x1. Finally, for p c 3(xl)2 we have the two-sided
local monopoly outcome pi(xl) - p2(xl) - 3.
Proof of Proposition 2.3.3 Let 9 G x~ - 1- x2 G 2. Firm i E 1 wants to
maximize its profit p;X;(x1,p1,p2), where X;(xl,pl,pz) ~s given by equations (2.2.5)
and (2.2.6). We look for a pair of prices such that plx and pz(1 - x) are maximal
in case x2 G xi, xi G 0, x2 ) 1. In case x2 G xi, xi ) 0, x2 G 1 prices are
such that pl(x - xi ) and p2(x2 - x) are maximal-Finally, in case xi G x2 , xi 1 0,
x2 G 1 prices are such that pl(xi - xi ) and p2(x2 - x2 ) are maximal. The case
xi G x2 , xi G 0, x2 ) 1 cannot occur because then xl G 2 ~rzin{x, 1 - x} which
contradicts 4 G xl G 2-For p) 1- 2x1 ~(xl)2 this yields the competitive outcome
p1(xl) - p2(xl) - 1- 2x~. For 0 G p G 3(z - xl)z we have the two-sided local
monopoly outcome pi(xi) - p2(xi) -~. The most difFicult part is to find the price
equilibrium in case x2 G xi , xi ) 0, x2 G 1, where prices are such that pl(x - xi )
and p2(x2 - x) are maximal. The first order conditions for profit maximization are
given by
x2-x' p'-2p' 2- 2- Z-0 for zEI. 2.7.10
2 ~ 2(x2 - xl) ~ (P - p,) p;( (p -
p;)) , 7 ~ ( )
Due to symmetry the first order conditions are solved by pi - p2 - p' where p' solves
the cubic equation
(P - p~)~ f 3(x2 - x~)(P - P~) ~ ((x2 - xl)2 - P)(P - p`)2 - ( x2 - x~)P - 0. (2.7.11)
By substituting y-(p - p~)~ ~(x2 - xl) into equation ( 2.7.11) we get the reduced
form of the cubic equation,
y3 - (P -~ 2(xz - xl)2)y f (x2 - xl)3 - 0. (2.7.12)
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Because 0- ~12'-4'~'~Z -(P}z(z27x,)z)3 G 0 the reduced form equation (2.7.12) has
three real roots. The three solutions yo, yl, and yz are given by
zyk - 2(p f 2(x3 - xi) )2cos(~ t3k~) k E {0,1, 2}, (2.7.13)
where ~ follows from cos(~) -- z2 2x''(p}z~x3-x'lZ)-2. For more details about
the derivation see for example Turnbull (1952) or Uspensky (1948). From equation
(2.7.11) it is easy to see that there is a unique value for p' such that p-p' 1 0. With-
out loss of generality we take ~ E[0, ~r~. Then it is easy to see that yl G yz G yo where
the equality sign holds for ~-~r. This implies that the unique equilibrium price is
found for k- 0. But then (p- p`) 2 - yo f 2x1-1 which yields the result stated in the
proposition. Finally it can be checked that p-(x~)z G p-(zf2x1-1)z G p-(2 -xl)z
requires that the reservation price p is between some bounds, where the lower bound
is greater than or equal to 3(2- xl )z and the upper bound is smaller than or equal to
1- 2x1 f(xl )z. The boundary solutions p-( 2- xl )z and p-(xl)z can be determined
easily then.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.1 Let -4 G x~ - 1- x2 G 0. The Nash equilibrium
for the price stage is given then by Proposition 2.3.1. If the equilibrium prices are
given by pi(xl) - p2(xl) - p'(xl) - 3-9(xl)z~-yxl((xl)z~-3;v)2, equilibrium profit
II; (xl) for firm i E I is increasing in xl because
~( ap~(xl)a~`xxl - P"(xl) f ax (xi f(P - p~(xl)) 2- 2(1~ - p~(xi))-' )- p`(xi).~ ~
This means that the optimal value for xl is the maximal value for xl such that
xl ~-(p)~, xl G 1-(p ~ q)~ and -4 G xl G 0. Note that this requires that
p G is. We find xi - 0 for 0 G p G 4 and xl - 1-(;v -}- 4)2 for 4 G p G is. If
the equilibrium prices are gíven by pi(xl) - p2(xl) - p`(xl) - p- (2 - xl)z, for firm
i E I equilibrium profit IIi(xl) - 2(p -(2 - xl)z) is increasing in xl. This means
that the optimal value for xl is the maximal value for xl such that xl 1 1-(p~- 4)2,
xl G 2 -(p f 1)~, and -4 G xl G 0. This requires that 4 G p G is. We find
xi - 0 for 4 G p G 4 with per firm profit equal to 2(p - 9) and xi - Z-(p f 1) ~
for 4 G p G 6 with per firm profit equal to (p f 1) ~- 1. If the equilibrium prices
are given by pi(xl) - p2(x1) - p'(xl) - 1- 2x1i for firm i E I equilibrium profit
II; (xl) - Z(1 - 2x1) is decreasing in xl. This means that the optimal value for xl is
the minimal value for xl such that xl ) 2-(p f 1)~ and -4 G x~ G 0. This requires
that p) 9. We find xi - 2-(p f 1)z for 4 G p G is with per firm profit equal to
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(p f 1) 2-1 and xi -- q for p? is with per firm profit equal to 4. Finally, profits are
zero if xl G-(p)2 and -9 G xl C 0, which requires that p G 16. Combining these
different cases yields maximum profits for the locations stated in the proposition.
Note that for 4 G p G 4, per firm profit is higher at xl - 0 than at xl - 1-(p f 9)z
because both the price and demand are higher in the first case. For 9 G p G 16 per
firm profit is higher at xl - 2-(p ~- 1)~ than at xl - 1-(p ~- 4)2 for the same
reason.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.2 Let 0 G xl - 1- x2 G 4. The Nash equilibrium for
the price stage is given then by Proposition 2.3.2. If the equilibrium prices are given
bY Pi(xi) - Pz(xl) - p`(xl) - 3, for firm i E I equilibrium profit II~(xl) - 4(3)2
does not depend on xl, so any (3)z G xl C 4 yields maximum profits for 0 G p C ls.
If the equilibrium prices are given by Pi(xl) - p2(xl) - p'(xl) - p-(xl)Z, for firm
i E I equilibrium profit II; ( xl) - 2x1(p -(xl)2) is increasing in xl. This means that
the optimal value for xi is the maximal value for xi such that (E)~ G xi G(3)~
and 0 G x G'- This re uires that - G 5 We find x' - P 2 for 0 G- G 3- 1- 4' q ~ lg- 1-(3) -~ 16
with per firm profit equal to 4( 3)~ and xi - 4 for 16 G~ G I6 with per firm profit
equal to 2 (p - 16). If the equilibrium prices are given by pi(x~) - p2(xt) - P'(xi) -
~- 9(xl)2 ~ 9x1((xl)2 f 3p)z, equilibrium profit II;(xl) for firm i E I is increasing
in xi as we have seen in the proof of Proposition 2.4.1. This means that the optimal
value for xl is the maximal value for xl such that xl G( 5)~, xl ~ 1-(p -~ á)~,
and 0 G xl G á. Note that this requires that p G á. We find x~ -(5)~ for
0 G p G is and xl - 1-(p ~ 9)2 for is G p G 4- If the equilibrium prices are
given by pi (xl ) - p2(xl ) - p` (xl ) - p- ( 2- xi )2, for firm i E I equilibrium profit
II; (xl )- 2(p-( 2-xl)~) is increasing in xl. This means that the optimal value for xl is
the maximal value for xl such that xl 1 1-(p~4)~, xl c z-(p-~1)~, and 0 G xl C 4.
This requires that 16 C p C 9. We find xi - 4 for 16 C p C 16 with per firm profit
equal to 2(p - is ) and xi - 2-(p ~- 1) z for e G p G 4 with per firm profit equal to
(p~-1)~ - 1. If the equilibrium prices are given by pl(xl) - pz(xl) - p'(xl) - 1-2x1i
for firm i E I equilibrium profit II; ( xl) - 2(1 - 2x1) is decreasing in xl. This means
that the optimal value for xl is the minimal value for xl such that xi ~ z-(~ f 1)~
and 0 G xl C 9. This requires that p) Is. We find xi - 2-(p f 1)~ for 16 ~ p G 4
with per firm profit equal to (p ~- 1)2 - 1 and xi - 0 for p? 9 with per firm profit
equal to 2. Combining these different cases yields, after some calculations, maximum
profits for the locations stated in the proposition.
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Proof of Proposition 2.4.3 Let 4 G xl - 1- x2 G 2. The Nash equilibrium
for the price stage is given then by Proposition 2.3.3. If the equilibrium prices are
given by pi(xl) - p~(xl) - 3, for firm i E I equilibrium profit II; (xl) - 4(3)~
does not depend on xl, so any 4 G xl G 2-(3)'i yields maximum profits for
0 G p G 16. If the equilibrium prices are given by pi(xl) - p2(xr) - p- ( xl)Z or by
pi(xl) - p2(xr) - p-(2 - xl)2, for firm i E I equilibríum profit is decreasing in xl.
The optimal value for xl equals 4 then, which yields p2 - p3. But then xi - 4 for
B C p C 16. Finally, if the equilibrium prices are given by pi(xl) - p2(xl) - 1-2x1i
for firm i E I equilibrium profit II,'(xl) - z( 1-2x1) is decreasing in xl. Consequently
xi-4forp~l6.
Proof of Theorem 2.5.1 Recall that for every xl there exists a unique price
equilibrium given by Propositions 2.3.1, 2.3.2, 2.3.3. We prove that for 0 C p G 16,
profits are maximal for all x~ E[(3)~, 2-(3) 2], which gives the required result.
Let 0 G p G 16. In case -4 G xl G 0 maximum profits are achieved for xl - 0
and are equal to 2( 3)~. In case 0 G xl G 2 maximum profits are achieved for all
xi E[(3) z, 2-( 3) 2] and are equal to 4( 3)~. It is obvious that profits are higher for
xi E[(3)2, 2-(3)~] than for xi - 0.
Proof of Theorem 2.5.2 Recall that for all xl there exists a unique price equilibrium























We prove that for p~ 16, profits are maximal for xi - xi(p). For 16 G p G 16,
maximum profits in case -á G xl G 0 are 2(3)2. In case 0 G xl G 2 maximum profits
are 2(p - 16 ), being achieved for xi - 9. It is easily checked that 2(p - rs )~ 2(3)~
for 16 G p G 16. For 16 G p G á, maximum profits in case -4 G xl G 0 are 2(3)~.
In case 0 C xl C 4, profits are (p ~- 1)2, and in case 9 G xl G z, profits are 4. For
i6 G p G 9 we have that 2( 3)~ G 4 G(p ~ 1) 2- 1. This means that profits are
maximal for xi - 2-(p ~ 1)~ E[0, 9]. For 9 G p C 4, maximum profits in case
- 4 G xl G 0 are 2(p - 4). In case 0 G xl G 4, profits are (p -}- 1) ~, and in case
4 G xl G 2, profits are 4. For á C p C á we have that 4 G 2(p - 4) G(p f 1) ~- 1.
This means that profits are maximal for xi - 2-(p -~ 1)z E[0, 4]. For p) 4,
maximum profits in case 0 G xl G 4 are equal to 2 and are higher than profits 4 in
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case 4 G xl G 2. For p 1 4 we thus only need to compare profits in case -4 G xl G 0
and in case 0 G~1 G 4. For 4 G p G 16 , maximum profits in case -4 G xl G 0 are
(p f 1) ~- 1 and maximum profits in case 0 G z'1 G 4 are 2. Because (p -} 1) 2- 1~ 2
for 4 C p C is, Profits are maximal for xï - 2-(p ~- 1)2 E[-4,0~. For p~ is it is
easy to see that profits are maximal for ~i --4.
Proof of Proposition 2.6.1 We prove the proposition for p~ 3. For 0 G p G 3
we refer to Boyer and Moreaux (1993). The proof goes for firm 1, but for firm 2 the
proof is similar. There are two relevant maximization problems for firm 1. Either it
maximizes its competitive profit pl~ subject to the constraints x G x~ and x G 1,
or it maximizes its local monopoly profit plxi subject to the constraints xi G~
and xi G 1. For 0 G pz G 3 the competitive solution equals p1 -~ with profit
pZ}1 2. For 3 C pz C P the competitive solution equals pl - pz - 1 with profits pz - 1.a -
The relevant local monopoly solution equals pl - pz - 1~- 2(p - pz)2 with profits
(pz - 1~ 2(p - pz)2 )( 1 -(p - pz)~ ) ~ pz -1 G p'ál ~. Therefore, the price reaction
function of firm 1 is given by
~ if 0 C pz C 3
Pi(Pz) - z





In this chapter, we present a generalization of the standard Hotelling (1929) model of
spatial competition where firms first choose locations and then, given these ]ocations,
compete in prices. In the model consumers are distributed according to a piecewise
uniform density along a line segment, whereas in the standard model consumers are
distributed with uniform density. The different pieces are referred to as intervals. This
specification of the consumers' density could make our results widely applicable, be-
cause any density function can be approximated with a piecewise uniform density, by
passing to finer partitions. As a consequence the firms' profit functions are piecewise
quasi-concave and they are not differentiable everywhere due to the fact that demand
is kinked. For any given locations and prices, however, both firms know that there
is a unique indifferent consumer. This means that only the exact interval in which
the indifferent consumer is located, may be uncertain for both firms. Therefore we
encompass the firms with beliefs about the interval in which the indifferent consumer
is located, called the state. Recently Geanakoplos, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1989) and
Kolpin (1992) introduced the psychological game to provide a framework for the for-
mal analysis of strategic settings in which expectations play a role'. The principal
characteristic of a psychological game is that the firms' expected profits depend on
what everybody believes. Given their beliefs, the firms' expected demands are differ-
entiable everywhere and the firms' expected profit functions are quasi-concave. We
lIn another context these, subjective, expectations are oCten referred to as emotions.
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define the game where firms first choose beliefs and then maximize the corresponding
expected profit in two stages to be a psychological game.
We show that there exists a unique psychological equilibrium for this game. Such
an equilibrium consists of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the two-stage game
given certain beliefs and the beliefs are such that the equilibrium outcome is consis-
tent with these beliefs, i.e., the state corresponds to the location of the indifferent
consumer. In equilibrium, the indifferent consumer is exactly the median consumer
while both firms have identical profits. Furthermore we present a natural way to find
the psychological equilibrium, which implicitly requires firms to coordinate on the
interval that contains the indifferent consumer.
This chapter is related to the work of Goeree and Ramer (1994), who general-
ize the results for the traditional two-stage location-then-price game, by allowing for
log-concave densities, and to the work of Tabuchi and Thisse (1995), who look at
the specific example of a triangular density in more detail. They find that in general
equilibrium profits differ over the two firms. In case of a triangular density we show,
however, that the firm with the lower profit has a profit that is lower than the psy-
chological equilibrium profit, which casts doubt on the credibility of the asymmetric
outcome. As Geanakoplos, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1989) argue, the usual solution
concepts are valid only as long as the correct payoff function is employed.
There are several reasons to favour the psychological game approach. First, the
psychological equilibrium outcome is robust in the sense that the indifferent consumer
is exactly the median consumer. The firms' locations and prices are determined
completely by the density function then. Second, equilibrium outcomes are such that
both firms have the same profit, so, even without restricting one firm to locate to
the left of the other firm, neither firm has an incentive to deviate. In that sense the
coordination problem arising in Goeree and Ramer (1994) does not appear. Third,
the psychological game approach is also applicable in case of density functions that
are not log-concave.
This chapter is based on Webers (1994a, 1996b) and is organized as follows. In
Section 2 the model is presented and the definition of psychological game is given. In
Section 3 the psychological equilibrium for this game is introduced and the equilibrium
conditions are derived. In Section 4 we prove the existence of a, generically, unique
psychological equilibrium with consistent beliefs. In Section 5 we use a coordination
argument to find this equilibrium. In Section 6 we discuss the case of a triangular
density and in Section 7 we briefly look at the two-dimensional case. The proofs are
gathered in Section 8.
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3.2 The model
There is a continuum of consumers distributed along the line segment [0,1] with
cumulative density function ,Fl :[0, 1] ~--r [0, 1]. There are two firms, indexed i E I-
{ 1, 2}. Firm i E I locates at x; along the real line and sells the commodity at price
p; E R~. Real income of the consumers is given by w. Each consumer buys one unit
of the commodity from the firm that offers the highest indirect utility, for firm i E I
being given by
~;(x, x~,Pt) - w- pZ - t(x, x,), (3.2.1)
where x is the consumer's location in the unit interval. The number t(x, x;) is the
transportation cost for shipping the product of firm i to this consumer's location. We
assume this transportation cost to be quadratic in distance with unit cost equal to
one, i.e., t(x, x;) -(x - x;)z. The market area of the product of firm i E I at given
locations xl and xz and prices pl and Pz is therefore given by
Mi(xlix2~i~lii~2) - {x E [~, 1] ~ U(xoxit~i) ~ ~j(x~x7v~J)i.~ ~ ~}i
i.e., the set of consumers that prefer the commodity of firm i over the commodity of
firm j, j ~ i E I. The demand X;(xl, xz, pl, pz) for the commodity of firm i E I then
is equal to
X~(x~, xz, P~, Pz) dx. (3.2.2)
- M ~(zi~TZ~Pi~PZÍ
By definition, the sum of the commodity demands equals one. Given xl, xz, pl and
pz the location of the consumer indifferent between buying from firm 1 and buying
from firm 2 is given by
xl -1- xz Pz - Pi
x(xi,xz,Pi,Pz) - 2 ~ 2(xz - x,)' (3.2.3)
being the midpoint between the firms' locations corrected for price differences. Under
the assumption that the price differences are not too large, both firms will sell their
products. From equations (3.2.2) and (3.2.3) it follows that for i E 1
X~(x~,xz,P~,Pz) -.~~(x(x~,xz,P~,Pz)), (3.2.4)
where for all x E[0, 1], ,~z(x) - 1 -.~1(x). Given the locations xl and xz and prices
pl and pz the profit of firm i E I is equal to p;.~;(x(xl, xzi p~, pz)), where costs are
assumed to be normalized to zero.
The function .FI is assumed to be continuous, but may be non-differentiable in
a finite number of, say n- 1, points tl, ..., tn-1, with 0 - to G tl G... C tn-1 G
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tn - 1. For k E IC - {0, . .., n- 1}, we assume there is a differentiable function
.F;k :[0,1] ~--~ 1R~ such that . F; coincides with .F;k for tk G x G tk}1i i E I. We assume
that each firm has beliefs about the state, being the interval in which the indifferent
consumer is located. The beliefs b;k firm i E I has about the location of the indifferent
consumer to lie in the interval [tk, tk fl], k E 1C, is represented by the vector of beliefs
b; -(b;o, . .. , b;ln-~1) in the set B; -{y E [0,1]n ~~k-ó yk - 1}. At beliefs b; E B;
and with the indifferent consumer located at x E [0,1], the expected demand F;(b;, ~)
for firm i E 1 is given by
n-1
F;(b„ ~) - ~ 6rk.F;k(~). ( 3.2.5)
k-0
Clearly, for given b; E B;, the expected demand function F;(b;, .), i E 1, is differ-
entiable. For simplicity, given 6; E B; the function F; is assumed to be three times
continuously differentiable. Note that in case .Fl is ( three times) continuously differ-
entiable and hence n - 1, expected demand is equal to demand.
For given beliefs b; E B;, the expected profit for firm i E I is equal to
n~(bt,~~,~z,P~,pz)-p~F;(b„~(~~~~z,pr,pz)). (3.2.6)
Now we are able to introduce the psychological game.
Definition 3.2.1 The game where firms first choose beliefs and then maximize the
corresponding expected profit in a two-stage location-then-price game tis a(strategic
form) psychological game G.
At given beliefs b- (bl, bz) E B- Bl x Bzi the two-stage game with payoffs
II1(bl,.) and IIz(bzi.) is a conventional two-stage location-then-price game, which we
refer to as G(b).
3.3 The equilibrium concept
First we define the solution concept for the two-stage location-then-price game G with
beliefs. At given beliefs b E B and at given locations ~1 G~z, suppose p;(b, ~1i xz)
is the unique corresponding Nash equilibrium príce for firm i E I. Given these prices
the firms choose locations as to maximize their expected profits. Because equilibrium
prices depend on the other firm's beliefs, also the firm's location choices for the
game G(b) will depend on the other firm's beliefs. Suppose the corresponding Nash
equilibrium locations are unique also, to be denoted by xi(b) for firm 1 and x2(b) for
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firm 2. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy at beliefs b E B for the game
G(b) is denoted by s`(b) - c xi(b), xá(b), {(pi(b, xl, xa), pi(b, xl, xs)) ~ xl C x2} ).
Consequently, at given beliefs b E B, the indifferent consumer is located at
x.(b) - xi(b) ~ xi(b) ~ p`s(b, xi(b), xá(b)) - pi(b, xi(b), xs(b)). (3.3.7)
2 2(x2(b) - x;(b))
We say that beliefs b E B are consistent if for all i E I and for all k E 1C
bik - 1 ]f tk ~ x'(b) ~ tk}1
b;k - 0 if x'(b) G tk or x'(b) ~ tktl
b;k E [0, 1] otherwise,
so, expected demand is equal to realized demand.
(3.3.8)
Definition 3.3.1 A psychological equilibrium for a psychological game G with unique
subgarrce perfect Nash equilibria at any beliefs is a pair of strategies s' and beliefs
b' E B such that b' is consistent and s' is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy
for the game G(b'), i.e., s' - s"(b`).
First we determine the solution to the location-then-price game for fixed beliefs
b E B. For i E I, let ft denote the first order derivative of F; with respect to x, let
f; denote the second order derivative of Ft with respect to x and let f;' denote the
third order derivative of F~ with respect to x. For simplicity we let f;(b;,x) 1 0 for
all b; E B; and x E [0,1]. For firm i E I, the corresponding first order condition for





while the second order condition for a maximum is given by
C2f~(b„ x) - f,(b~, x) f;
(b~, x)~ ~~ G 0, (3.3.10)
where x is given by equation (3.2.3). In general, the set of equations (3.3.9) and
(3.3.10) has multiple solutions, or no solutions at all. For the case where .Fl is three
times continuosly differentiable and consequently .Fl - Fl, i.e., beliefs do not matter,
Goeree and Ramer (1994) prove the existence of a unique price equilibrium assuming
log-concavity of .Fl. They apply a theorem of Caplin and Nalebuff (1991) in order to
show the quasi-concavity of the profit functions. For the case where .Fl is continuous
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but not differentiable everywhere, in the next section, for any beliefs b E B, we prove
the existence of a unique price equilibrium for the situation of piecewise linearity of
.~1. In this case profit is piecewise quasi-concave. With a piecewise linear .~1 we are
able to approximate any cumulative density function by passing to finer partitions,
i.e., by increasing n.
However, for the time being we need only the existence of a unique solution
p;(b, xl, xz) for i E I to the price stage at any beliefs b E B. For ease of notation we
write x'(b, xl, xz) - x(x~, xzi pl(b, xl, xz), p2(b, xl, xz)). The profit of firm i E I at the
equilibrium prices is denoted by II; (b, xr, xz) - II;(b, xl, xz, pl(b, xl, xz), p2(b, xl, xz)).
Given these prices, firm i E I strategically chooses at beliefs b E B location x; as to
maximize its profit II; (b, xl, xz). For firm i~ j E I, the corresponding first order
condition for the location stage yields
F;(b~,x'(b)).f;(bá,x'(b))- (2(f~(bt,x`(b)))z-F;(b;,x'(b))f,(b„x'(b)))X
(x~(b) - x~(b))ay~ ax;'x2 ~(s,(b),zZ(6))~









It is easily checked that for all i E I it holds
-1
8x"(b, xi, xz) 1 3- Fi ( bi,
x~(b, xi, xz))f~(bi~ x~(b, xi, xz)) . (3.3.13)
áx; - 2( ~ (fi( bi, x"(b, xi, xz)))z
Consequently, assuming that xi(b) and x2(b) are the unique solutions to (3.3.11),
s'(b) -c xi(b), x2(b), {(pi(b, xl, xz), pz(b, xl, xz)) ~ xl C xz} ) is the unique subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium strategy for the game G(b).
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3.4 Existence of psychological equilibria
We consider a piecewise uniform density function having a piecewise linear cumulative
density. We assume that for some n E N, on each interval [~-~, knl], k E IC, consumers
are located with density dk}1 ] 0 such that
n-1
~ dk}i - n.
k-0
This means that tk -~ for k E IC. The density will be denoted by the tuple
G dl, ..., dn 1. Note that we have the standard uniform case when n- 1 or dk}1 - 1
for each k E 1C. We denote Dk -~~-o d~ for all k E iC, where we define do - 0. For
given beliefs bi E B;, the expected demand for firm i E I is linear in x and can be
written as
F,(b;, ~) - 7,(b,) f ê;(b;)x, (3.4.14)
where
7i(bi) - ~-~ ~k-i bik(Dk - kdk}i), 7z(bz) - 1 - ,'-~ ~k-í' bzk(Dk - kdk}i),
b1(61) - ~k-0 blkdk}1, Sz(bz) - - ~k-0 bzkdk}1.
Clearly, fZ(b;, ~) - b;(b;) and f;(b;, ~) - f,"(b;, x) - 0 for all i E I and b; E B;.
Equation ( 3.3.9) can be rewritten then as
P;(b, ~~, ~z) - -(~ f ry'(b`) ) ~ a~ ~ 1 (3.4.15)s~(b~) `aP~
and the second order conditions for a maximum are fulfilled because Sl(bl) 1 0 and
bz(bz) G 0. Note that -yz(bz) - 1- yl(bl) and Sz(bz) --bl(bl) in case firms have
identical beliefs, i.e., b, - bz.
Proposition 3.4.1 For any density G dl, ..., dn 1 with n E N, any b E B and any
~1 G xzi there exists a unique solution to the price stage for the game G(b) given by
P; (b, ~i, ~z) -
xz - xi ~i ~ ~z -F 47;(b;) 27i(bi)
3 ( b;(b;) - b;(b;)
fori~jEl.
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Proof
Substitution of the prices from equation ( 3.4.15) into equation (3.2.3) yields
xr f ~z 7~(bl) 7z(bz)~'(b,x~,xz) - 6 - 3b1(bl) - 3bz(bz).
The corresponding prices are given then by
. ~z - ~1 ~ 4~;(bi) - 27~(bi)~
Pt (b, ~r, ~z) - ~r f ~z f3 S;(b,) b;(b,)
fori~jEl
Requiring the prices to be positive yields a condition on ~1 and xzi namely
27z(bz) 47i(bi) 2ryi(bi) 47z(bz)
bz(bz) - ói(bi) ~ ~1 ~ ~z C bi(bi) - óz(bz)
. (3.4.16)
Furthermore it is easily found from equation (3.3.13) that for all i E I it holds
that
ó~'(b, xi, ~z) - 1
áx; 6.
(3.4.17)
Given the prices p; (b, ~r, xz), i E I, the firms choose locations as to maximize
their expected profits. The profit of firm i~ j E I can be written then as
z
. bt(b~)(~z - ~r) 47t(bt) 2?'~(bi)R;(b,~r,xz) - 18 ~~i f~z f b;(b~) ~ bi(bi)
. (3.4.18)
Proposition 3.4.2 For any density G dl, ..., d~ 1 with n E N and any beliefs b E B,
there eaists a unique solution to the location stage for the game G(b) given by
1 7~(6~) 571(bt)
~`(b) - 4(ó~(b~) - b;(b,)
)
fori~jE7.
Proof See Sectíon 8.
It is easily checked that equation ( 3.4.16) is satisfied at the solution a-i(b) and
x2(b) in case of identical beliefs. In equilibrium the indifferent consumer is located at
~.(b) - -1(7r(b~) ~ 7z(bz)) (3.4.19)2 bl(bl) 6z(bz)
From this we derive the following theorem.
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Theorem 3.4.3 For any density G dl, ..., dn ) with n E IlV, generically, there exists
a unique psychological equilibrium ( s', b') with s' - s(b'). In equilibrium, for all
i E I, b;k. - 1 for the (generically) unique value k` E 1C for which ~ G z G Dk~'-
and b;k - 0 for k~ k' E~.
Proof See Section 8.
In the non-generic case, ~- z for some k' E iC, i.e., the median consumer is
exactly located at a corner, and both k' -1 and k` induce a psychological equilibrium.
Profits for both firms, however, are maximized for the value of k E{k' - 1, k'} for
which the corresponding value dk is minimal, because then equilibrium prices are
higher while demand is 2 in both cases. When dk.-1 - dk., profits are the same for
both values of k. Consequently, for all i E I and for all symmetric beliefs 6 E B with
b;(k.-1) - 1- 6;k. and b;k. E[0,1], profits are maximized then and the indifferent
consumer is exactly the median consumer.
For convenience we write yl - 1- y2 - n(Dk. - k'dk.~l) and ói --b2 - dk.~~,
which are the corresponding values in case b~ and b2 are such that óik. - 62k. -
1. Equilibrium beliefs b' E B are such that both firms have the same (expected)
demands. We denote x` - x'(b'). In equilibrium the indifferent consumer is located
at
1 - 2ryi
x' - 2b, (3.4.20)
i
which is exactly the median consumer because Fl(x`) - 1- F2(x`) - 2. In case of
symmetric densities equation (3.4.20) reduces to x' - 2. For n odd, we have k' - n21
n-2(Dk.-k'dk.fl) - 2k'}1 1 s~ nthen, which gives x' - 2ndk. fl - 2n - 2. For n even, k is either 2- 1 or
2 and similarly it follows x' - 2.
Corollary 3.4.4 For any density G dl, ..., dn ) with n E ]f~i, generically, the unique
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome for the game G(b') is given 6y locations
xl -- 46'ryl and x2 - 54ó;' and by prices pi - pz - zá~~ , (~)'
Proof
For the equilibrium beliefs b' E B specified in Theorem 3.4.3 it is easy to calculate
that xi - x; ( b') and p; - p; ( b', xi(b'), x2(b`)) for i E 1 from Propositions 3.4.1 and
3.4.2 by substituting ryi, y2, bi, and b2.
O
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Thus the two firms always charge the same price in equilibrium and furthermore
both firms have different locations in equilibrium. This means that the principle of
minimum differentiation no longer holds. Note that these results are similar to the
results Lederer and Hurter (1986) find for the situation of discriminatory pricing.
In case of a symmetric density the result in Corollary 3.4.4 reduces to locations
~j - 2- 9d 3 and ~2 - 2-~ 4d; . Intuitively this 'symmetric' result is what we
could expect.}It is exactly the result Goeree and Ramer (1994) find for symmetric
densities in case .Fl is differentiable. Because the prices and demands are the same




Finally we look at the degree of differentiation in equilibrium.
Lemma 3.4.5 For any density G dl, ..., dn 1 with n E N, generically, the degree of
di~erentiation in equilibrium is equal to x2 - xi - 2d 3k }1
Proof
In equilibrium xi and ~2 are according to Corollary 3.4.4. But then we can write
,~ 5-4ry~ -1-4ry~ - 3 3
2y - .xj - 4á; - Q ó; - Zbl - 2dk~}~ .
In particular if the consumers are distributed uniformly then the degree of differ-
entiation is equal to 2 with locations .~i --9 and ~2 - 4. Furthermore, if dk.~l C 1
then x2 -~i 1 2 and if dk.}1 1 1 then .x2 - xi G 2. Consequently, for the limit-
ing case dk.~l - n, i.e., demand is concentrated entirely in an infinitesimal ínterval,
the degree of differentiation tends to zero if n goes to infinity. Only for this case,
Hotelling's principle of minimum difFerentiation is restored. In general we find that,
when demand is more concentrated at the centre both firms will locate closer to the
centre, and, when demand is concentrated at the endpoints, both firms will locate
further away from the centre.
3.5 A coordination argument
As argued before, both firms know that for any tuple of locations and prices, generi-
cally, there is a unique interval in which the indifferent consumer is located. The only
uncertainty the firms face is that a priori they do not know what interval will result.
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Let the beliefs of firm i E 1 about the location of the indifferent consumer to lie in
any of the intervals [n, ~], k E JC, be represented by the vector 6; -(b;o, . .., b;ln-r))
in the set B; - {y E {0,1}n ~~k-áyk - 1}. This means that the vector b; E B;,
i E I, is a unit vector. We will write b;(k) E B; for the kth unit vector, k E~.
Because of consistency, it is natural to assume that the firms coordinate on the same
beliefs. Let these identical beliefs be denoted by 6(k) E B` -{(y, y) E Bi x BZ}. The
corresponding conventional two-stage location-then-price game with beliefs b(k) E B`
is referred to as G(b(k)). Because, generically, equilibrium beliefs b` are in B`, the
unique equilibrium stated in Theorem 3.4.3 will be found again, generically, but the
approach in this section to find this equilibrium is based on coordination. At beliefs
6(k) E B`, expected demand for firm i E I is linear in x and can be written as
F;k(~) - ryk ~- S;`.x (3.5.21)
where
-y; - 1 - ry2 - n (Dk - kdk}r ),
ó; - -b2 - dkf,.
Applying Proposition 3.4.1 then yields the solution
~2 - ~r ( 2n -~ 2(Dk - kdkfr )1
P~(b(k), ~r, ~s) - 3 I`~i ~- ~z f ndk}r l
( 3.5.22 )
to the price stage for the game G(b(k)) by substituting yk and ók for ry;(b;) and ó;(b;),
respectively, for all i E 1. The solution to the location stage is found from Proposition








Note that the firms are located symmetrically around n if Dk - 2. At these locations
and prices the indifferent consumer is expected to be located at
~~(b(k)) -
k ~ n - 2Dk.
n 2ndkt 1
(3.5.24)
We say that this outcome is consistent if n C x'(b(k)) C knr. Rewriting equation
(3.5.24) then yields the following result.
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Lemma 3.5.1 For any density C dl, ..., dn 1 with n E N, the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium outcome for the game G(b(k)) is consistent if k E K satisfies the condition
0C n-2Dk C2dkf1.
As we know already from Theorem 3.4.3, generically, there exists a unique psy-
chological equilibrium.
Proposition 3.5.2 For any density C dl, ..., dn ~ with n E N, there is at least one
value k' E 1C for which b(k') induces a psychological equilibrium. If k' E IL is not
unique, either b(k' - 1) or 6(k` -}- 1) also induces a psychological equilíbrium.
Proof See Section 8.
From Lemma 3.5.1 we know that k' must satisfy the condition
Dk' ~ 1 ~ Dk"}1
n - 2 - n
If Dk - 2 for some k E!C then we end up at the corner solution ~ where the
equilibria are paired, i.e., the indifferent consumer is the same. Otherwise we end up
at an interior solution, as we saw already in Theorem 3.4.3.
Corollary 3.5.3 For any density G dl, ..., dn ) with n E N, generically, the unique
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome for the game G(b(k')) where b(k'), gener-
icaldy, induces the psychological equilibrium is given by locations ~i' - ~- 4dkDk'
and 22' - n ~ 4nd4Dk" and prZCCS pl' - p2 - 2 d 3 2'k'}1 I k'}1~
Proof
This follows easily from Corollary 3.4.4.
It is easy to check that, given k', ~i' C n c x'(b") G ~ G x2', where
the last inequality results from the fact that 5n - 4Dk.}1 is positive. This means
that the indifferent consumer is located to the right of firm 1 and to the left of
firm 2 and, furthermore, the firms are located outside the interval [n, k~~]. This
formalizes Smithies' (1941) notions of 'competitive region' for the region [~i', ~2'] and
of 'hinterlands' for the regions (-oo, xi') and (x2', oo). It is obvious by now that
the size of the competitive region crucially depends on the density. Nevertheless the
density is irrelevant for the size of the market areas.
3.6 The triangular density 45
3.6 The triangular density
In this section we apply the psychological game approach to an example introduced
by Tabuchi and Thisse (1995). Consider the cumulative density function .Fl :[0, 1] H
[0, 1] given by
fl(~) - I.Fio(~) for 0 C





where .Flk : [0, 1] ~--~ 1R, k E {0,1}, are given by .Flo(x) - 2x2 and ~11(x) - 4~ -
2x2 - 1. Note that at x- 2, .Fl is continuously differentiable only once. In case of
identical beliefs b-(b„b,) E B, expected demand for firm i E I is quadratic in x
and can be written as
F~(bs~ ~) - 7~(b,) ~- ó;(b,)x f Ê~(bs)~2, (3.6.25)
where
7~(b,) - 1 - "ryz(b,) - -b9~,
S~(bg) - -Ss(bs) - 4bs~,
Êi(bs) --ÊS(bs) - 2(bso - b,l) - 2- 4bs~.
Because Fl is logconcave there exists a unique solution to the price stage for all b E B,
given implicitly by equation (3.3.9). The solution to the location stage can be found
from equation (3.3.11).
Lemma 3.6.1 For beliefs b, - (1,0), the subgame perfect Nash equilibríum outcome
for the game G(b) is given by G -3(6)-~, 3(6)-~, lá, ~8 1 and the indifferent con-
sumer is located at (6)-2. For beliefs b, -(0,1), the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
outcome for the game G(b) is given by G 1- 3(6)-~, 1-}- 3(6)-~, is, lá ~ and the in-
different consumer is located at 1-(6)-~ . For beliefs b, -( 2, 2), the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium outcome for the game G(b) is given by G 8, á, á, á~ and the indif-
ferent consumer is located at 2.
Proof See Section 8.
Because (6)-2 G 2 C 1-(6)-~, it is easy to see that all these three equilibrium
outcomes are consistent. In fact these are the only three consistent equilibrium out-
comes. The first two, asymmetric, solutions are the ones found by Tabuchi and Thisse
(1995) and Goeree and Ramer (1994), which in fact require firms to be treated asym-
metrically. The third, symmetric, solution is the one which follows by approximating
the cumulative density function with a piecewise linear cumulative density.
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Consider therefore the following piecewise uniform density with n~ E N, i.e., n
odd. On each interval [n, k~], k E!C, consumers are located with density dk}1 1 0
such that
- ~ 4n k}1
(n}1)dkt,
for k E {0,...,nz1}
for k E{nzl ~- 1,...,n - 1}.
( 3.6.26 )
Then we get the following result.
Lemma 3.6.2 For the density G dl, ..., dn 1 with n~ E N specified in equation
(3.6. `~6), the unique psychological equilibrium outcome is found for k' - "21 and is
equal to G n-3, 7n}3 , 3 n}~1 ~' 3 n}~ 2~ For n -~ oo we get the unique symmetric
Srz 8n Sn Sn
equilibrium outcome G 8 , 8, á, 8 1 as a limiting case.
Proof
For n E N odd it is clear from Theorem 3.4.3 that k' - n2'. But then we can
calculate Dk. - 2(nfl) and dk.~l -}1 from which it follows that ryi --2~n~1) and
bi -}1. Corollary 3.4.4 then gives the required result. The limiting result is found
immediately.
It is clear by now that approximating a cumulative density function with a piece-
wise linear cumulative density lets the asymmetric equilibria disappear. The reason
is that in the psychological equilibrium no firm has an incentive to deviate as long as
expected losses, i.e. the losses for given beliefs, are too high. Accordingly, in general
the psychological equilibrium is not an equilibrium for the 'standard' game without
beliefs. In the unique symmetric psychological equilibrium the indifferent consumer
is exactly the median consumer. Consequently, firms' demands, prices and profits are
the same.
3.7 The two-dimensional case
In this section we point out briefly the applicability of our results to the two- dimen-
sional case, i.e., the case where consumers are located on the square S-[0, 1] x[0,1].
For ease of exposition we let consumers be distributed uniformly over S. Firm i E I is
located at x; E S and sells the commodity at price p;. For convenience we let xl ~ x2.
Because transportation costs are assumed to be quadratic in distance, the set of in-
different consumers is a line segment perpendicular to the line passing through the
firms' locations. For any fixed location pair, the demand for the commodity of firm
i E I can be approximated by a one-dimensional density G dl, ..., dn , with n E N,
dn-k
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and consequently Theorem 3.4.3 can be applied. Note, however, that the density
depends on the line on which they are located. Essentially this means that firms also
have to decide upon the line along which to locate. In Figure 3.1 the bold line depicts
the possible equilibrium locations in case firms locate symmetrically on a fixed line
through the centre (z, z). The two dashed lines depict the degree of differentiation
at the corresponding equilibrium configuration.
(2,4)
Figure 3.1: Possible equilibrium locations.
We see that the degree of differentiation lies between its minimum 9(2)2 for loca-
tions ~1 -(8, 8) and ~2 -(á, á), and its maximum 2 for locations ~1 -(-4, 2) and
~2 -( 4, 2). The first result is exactly the result stated in Lemma 3.6.2, but then on
the interval [0, (2)2 ] instead of [0,1]. The second result is exactly the result for the
uniform case as can be seen from Lemma 3.4.5. In case the degree of differentiation
equals á(2)2 per firm profit is 8 and in case the degree of differentiation equals 2
per firm profit is á. So profits for both firms are maximi~ed in case the degree of
differentiation is maximal.
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3.8 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.4.2
Recall that for each density G dr, ..., dn 1 with n E N and beliefs b E B, expected
demand for firm i E I is linear in ~. Equation (3.3.11) then reduces to
7ti(bt) . ~;(b) - ~i(b)
b;(b,) } ~ (b) - 3
for i~ j E I. Surnmation over i E I yields
~. b - - 1 7r(br) ~ 7z(bz)).
( ) - 2(ar(bi) ó2(b2)
Substitution of (3.8.28) into (3.8.27) then yields the required result
1 7~(b~) - 51';(bti)




The second order conditions for a maximum are fulfilled (at least in case of identical
beliefs), because F;(bt,.) being affine, equation (3.3.12) reduces to ~' 62 G ry' 6' for
b2(6z) ái(61)
all i E I, where we use the fact that ax~(b'x"x') -'- for all i~ j E I.8x, 6
Proof of Theorem 3.4.3
From Propositions 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 we know that (up to symmetry) there is a unique
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium s`(b) -G ~i (b), ~2(b), {(p~ (b, xr, ~2), p2(b, ~1, x2)) ~
sr G~2} ] for the game G(b) for any b E B. Given beliefs b' E B, there generically
exists a unique corresponding state, i.e., there is a unique value k' E K such that
n G ~`(b`) G k'-~. According to (3.3.8), consistency requires that, for all i E I,
b;k, - 1 and b;k - 0 for k ~ k` E~. This means that equilibrium beliefs are
identical. From equation (3.4.19) we find that x`(b`) -~. Substitution in thesa~
constraint n G x'(b') G k~n' yields
Dk' 1 Dk`}r- G - G .
n 2 - n
(3.8.29)
Finally we have to show that there is a unique value k` E K that satisfies equation
(3.8.29). Suppose without loss of generality that equation (3.8.29) is also satisfied for
some k ) k' ~ 1. Then 1 G Dk~- G~, which contradicts ~- G'- unless k - k` ~ 12- n - n n- 2~
and D~ - 'n 2'
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Proof of Proposition 3.5.2
The first part we prove by contradiction using an induction argument. Let ICk be
defined as {0, ..., k} for any k E 1C. Suppose that there is no equilibrium for k E Ko.
Then from Lemma 3.5.1 we know that the condition 0 G 2ndDi G n does not hold- t -
for k- 0. Since Do - 0 the condition can be rewritten as 0 G 2d1 G n. Clearly
0 G 2dj always holds, therefore it must be that dl G z. Next suppose that there is no
equilibrium for k E~i. If there is no equilibrium for k- 1 then the condition 0 G
n2d' G n does not hold. Because there is no equilibrium for k- 0 we furthermore
know that dl G 2. But then the condition simplifies to Dz G 2. By induction we see
that there is no equilibrium for all k E ICn-1 if and only if D~ G 2, which contradicts
Dn - 1. Therefore there exists an equilibrium for some k' E~n-i -~. But then
~ G 2 G Dk-~. Now suppose without loss of generality that there also exists an
equilibrium for some k) k' where k E IC. This means that ~ G 2 G D~. But
then D~ 1 1)~~ D~ )~ which means that D~'- must be equal to 2 andn - 2- ~n - n - n n
k be equal to k' ~- 1. It is easy to see that there are at most two equilibria. Suppose
to the contrary that there exists a third equilibrium for say rn 1 k E IC, then we get
~ Dk 1- Dkfdk}1 1 dk 1 1 ~ 1
~~~- n ~ 2{- ~~ 2 while G 2 is required.
Proof of Lemma 3.6.1
For beliefs b9 -(1, 0) we have 71 - 1- 72i ól - ó2 - 0, and Ël --Ë2 - 2.
Consequently, Fl (bs, x) - 2x2 and FZ(bs, x) - 1- 2x2. From the first order conditions
for the location stage, equation ( 3.3.11), we then find the solution x'(b) -(6)-2. It
is easily checked that xi(b) - -3(6)-2 and x2(b) - 3 (6)-~. The corresponding prices
are 18 and ig , respectively. The proof for the situation 63 -(0, 1) is similar and is
left to the reader. For beliefs bs - ( 2, 2) we have 7i - 1- ry"2 - - z, ól --ó2 - 2,
and ÊI --Ê2 - 0. Consequently, Fl(bs, x) - 2x - 2 and F2(bs, x) - 2 - 2x. From
equation ( 3.3.11) we then find the solution x'(b) - 2. Furthermore xi(b) - á and
x2(b) - 8. The corresponding price is 8 for both firms.
Chapter 4
The Location Model with two
Periods of Price Competition
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we analyze a variant of the standard Hotelling (1929) model of spa-
tial competition in which firms first choose locations and then, given these locations,
compete in prices for two subsequent periods. In this model location is a two-period
commitment, because, for example, the costs of relocation after one period are rela-
tively too high. Furthermore the firms take into account the impact of their location
decisions on their total profits. If the structure of competition is the same for both
periods, the location decision is the same as in the one period model, only profits are
obtained twice. If however the structure of competition is different over the periods,
for example due to changes in the demand side over time, the outcome of the one
period model is not appropriate.
We consider an economy with two firms and two types of vertically differentiated
consumers, i.e., consumers have different valuations for the qualities of the product
offered by the firms. The valuations consumers have for the products of the firms can
be seen as price adjustments to compensate for (subjective) quality differences. The
consumers are located uniformly along the unit interval. The fractions of consumer
types may differ over time. In each period, the consumers buy one of the mutually
exclusive commodities. Consumers take a decision per period and buy from the firm
with the lowest overall price. As in Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992), we use
an indirect utility function that incorporates both transportation costs and quality
difference or vertical differentiation aspects. This chapter is related to the recent
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literature concerning the combination of horizontal and vertical differentiation. For
example, for the combination of horizontal and vertical differentiation see Neven and
Thisse (1990), and for the combination of two types of horizontal differentiation see
Tabuchi (1994).
We show that there is a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the location-
then-price game with two periods of price competition. The firms' location decisions
are influenced by two different effects. First, firms tend to locate closer to each other
because of the volatility in the excess valuations, i.e., the variation in the excess
valuations over time. Second, firms tend to locate in the same direction, due to the
average excess valuation for the firms over time. Here, the on average more preferred
firm can take advantage of its position in the market. In the extreme case where
the average excess valuation over time is zero we only have the first effect, being
maximal when volatility is maximal. In this case, the per firm profit and therefore
also the aggregate profits decrease with volatility. In the other extreme case, where
the average valuation over time is (relatively) maximal, we only have the second effect,
being at its maximum then. In this case aggregate profits are increasing in volatility.
The per firm profit, however, decreases with volatility for one firm and increases with
volatility for the other firm.
When the average excess valuation over time is zero, we see that horizontal dif-
ferentiation is maximal compared to the standard one-period case if vertical differ-
entiation is zero in both periods, and that horizontal differentiation becomes lower
if vertical differentiation increases. Nevertheless, as in Tabuchi (1994), the firms will
never locate inside the unit interval, because the price competition is too fierce then.
When the average excess valuation over time is positive we see that horizontal
differentiation is maximal compared to the standard one-period case if vertical dif-
ferentiation is the same in both periods, and that horizontal differentiation becomes
lower if vertical differentiation differs over the two periods. Although the firms will
never locate too close because of price competition, it is possible now that one firm
locates inside the unit interval. These results also hold for the one-period model with
vertical differentiation, because this is a special case.
This chapter is based on Webers (1994b) and is organized as follows. In Section
2 the location-then-price game with two periods of price competition is formulated.
Section 3 and Section 4 discuss the price stage and the location stage, respectively.
Section 5 states the main result that there is a unique subgame perfect Nash equi-
librium for the location-then-price game. In Section 6 an example is presented. The
proofs are gathered in Section 7.
4.2 The model 53
4.2 The model
There is a continuum of consumers distributed uniformly with density one along the
line segment [0, 1]. In period T E 7- { 1, 2}, a fraction ae of the consumers is of
type B E O-{1,2}. The consumers of type 1 and type 2 will be referred to as the
young and the old, respectively. There are two firms, indexed i E I-{1,2}. Every
period, the young and the old differ with respect to their valuations of the quality
of a certain product offered by each of the two firms. The number aBr denotes the
valuation that consumers of type B E O have for the product of firm i E I at time
T E 7. This valuation may differ over time. Real income for consumers of both types
is given by w.
Once firms have settled, they serve the market from this location in the next two
periods. Before the start of period 1 both firms choose their locations. In period 1
and period 2 firms set prices. Firm i E I locates at ~; E 1R and sells the commodity
at price p;T in period r E T. We assume that firm 1 locates to the left of firm 2.
Assumption 4.2.1 Firrn 1 locates to the left of ftrrrz 2, i.e., ~i G~z.
Note that firms' locations may be outside the interval [0,1] (see also Tirole (1988,
p. 286) and Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992, p. 299))t. In period r E T each
type B E O consumer buys one unit of the commodity from the firm that offers the
highest indirect utility, for firm i E I being given by
~~1~i ~ii~ir) - w - ~ir ~ a~T - tl~i ~i)i (4.2.1)
where x is the consumer's location in the unit interval2. The number t(.~,x;) is the
transportation cost for shipping the product of firm i to this consumer's location. We
assume this transportation cost to be quadratic in distance with unit cost equal to
lAs was shown by Bdckem (1994) this corresponds to a situation where the price effect is domi-
nant. There a reformulation of the model of d'Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) is given,
for which, in equilibrium, the degree of differentiation is between the outcome of Hotelling (1929)
and d'Aspremont et al. (1979). In contrast to our model, Bbckem treats firms symmetrically, which
implies that both firms locate closer to the center. [n our model with asymmetric firms, restricting
them to locate in the unit interval would basically not change our findings. Our discussion how-
ever will not focus on the exact degree of differentiation but rather on the changes in the degree of
differentiation.
ZIt is assumed implicitly that w is sufficiently large, hence the indirect utility from buying is
non-negative.
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one, i.e., t(~, xi) -(x - xi)z. Note that t(x, ~;) is individual specific and that aB is
group specific. Per period, there are two different market areas. The market area of
the product of firm i E I for the consumers of type B E O in period T E T is therefore
given by
M~1~17~2)i~1T7p2T) -~~ E~0) 1~ I ~~1~)~i7piT) i V~~(27~1)p7T))~ ~ Z~)
i.e., the set of type B consumers at time r that prefer the commodity of firm i over
the commodity of firm j, j~ i E 1.
The demand X;T(~1, ~z, p1T, pzT) for the commodity of firm i E I in period T E T
is the sum of the demands in period T for the commodity of firm i by both types of
consumers, i.e.,
XiT(xl, ~z, p1T, pzT) -~
J
~~d~, for i E I, T E T. (4.2.2)
BEO MB ~x)~zz,P)T,PZT)
By definition, the sum of the commodity demands equals one in both periods.
At time r E T, given ~1, ~z, p1T and pzr, the location of the type B E O consumer
indifferent between buying from firm 1 and buying from firm 2 is given by
e ~1 T~z CzT - p1T Q~T - azT
~T(~1) ~z7 p1T) pzT) - 2 ~ 2(~z - .~1) ~ 2(.~z - ~, )'
(4.2.3)
being the midpoint between the firms' locations corrected for price differences and
consumers' valuation differences, so in general xT ~~?. Under the assumption that
the consumers' valuation differences and the price differences are not too large, both
firms however will sell their products to both the young and the old in both periods.
For ease of notation we will write ~B - xe(~1, ~z, p1T, pzT).
From equations (4.2.2) and (4.2.3) it then follows that in period r E T demand
equals
C~ ee
X1T(~1 )~z) p1T) pzT) - L.BEO aT~T
X2T(~11~i1(~1T)[~zT) - 1 - X1T(~1)~z1p1T)pzT)1
(4.2.4)
which means that firm 1's market share is a weighted sum of the location of the
indifferent consumer of both types. The weights are the respective fractions in the
population.
Given the locations and prices the profit of firm i E I in period r E T is equal to
~tT(~17~z7p1T7pzT) - piTX3T(~1)~z)p1T)pzT). (4.2.5)
Total profit of firm i E I is the discounted sum of the per period profits and is
given by
~t(~1)~27p11)p21)p127p22) - ~ PT~tT(~1)~z)p1T)p2T)7
rET
(4.2.6)
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where pT is the discount factor in period r E T. Costs are assumed to be normalized
to zero.
It is clear that the price choice in any period does not affect the price choice in the
other period. Therefore we can consider the price choices in both periods separately.
The price game in period r E T is solved by prices piT(xl,xz) and p2r(xl,xz) such
that
~1T(xl, x2, plr(xl, x2), p2T(xl, x2)) ~ ~lr(xl, x2, p1T, p2T(xl, x2))
~2T(xl,x2)p1T(xl)x2))i12T(xl,x2)) ~ ~2Tlxl,x2)p1T(~1)x2),p2T)
for all p1T E [0, oo) and pzT E [0, oo), respectively. For ease of notation, we write
~ilxl,x2) - ni(xl,x2,p11(xl,x2),p21(xl,x2),p12(xl,x2),p22lxl,x2)), 2 E 1.
An equilibrium of the location game is then given by some (xi, x2) satisfying
Assumption 4.2.1 and
ni(xi, xs) ~ ni (xl, x2) for all xl G x2
II2(xi, x2) 1 IIz(xi, xz) for all xz ~ xi.
A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the location-then-price game is given
by (xi,x2) and {((Pil(xl,xz),Pál(xl,xz)),(Piz(xl,xz),P2z(xl,xz))) ~ xl C xz}. The
equilibrium path is (xi,.x2) and (( pil(xi~xz),psl(xi~xs)), ( piz(xi,xá),pzz(xi,xi)))~
4.3 The price stage
The solution to the price stage is easy to find and is given in Proposition 4.3.1. In
each period, the firm sellíng the product for which on average the consumers have a
stronger preference, is able to set a higher price, while the other firm can only charge
a lower price. For r E T, define AT -~eeo ae(aBT - a2T). The number Ar measures
the excess valuation for firm 1 compared to firm 2 at time r.
Proposition 4.3.1 At locations xl and xz the price game at time r E T is solved by
prices piT(xl, xz) - 3((xz - xl)(2 -~- xl -~ xz) f 1LT) and psT(xl, xz) - 3((xz - xl)(4 -
xl - xz) - AT).
Proof As noted before the price choice in any period does not affect the price choice
in the other period. Therefore we can consider the price choices in both periods
seperately. Let xl, xz and r E T be given. Maximizing equation (4.2.5) with respect
to piT gives piT(xl, xz, pjT) - 2(xj - xi)XiT(xl, xz, plr, pzr), Z~,~ E I. For i- 1
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this means plT(~l,xz,pzT) - 2(pzT f AT f(~z -~i)(~z ~ xr)) and for i - 2 this
means pzT(~i,~z,PiT) - z(PiT - AT f(~z - xi)(2 - sl - xz)). Hence pi,(Ti,~z) -
3((~z - ~i)(2 } .xi f ~z) f AT) and psT(~i, ~z) - 3((~z - ~i)(4 - al - xz) - AT).
~
Notice that the equilibrium price in period r E 7 depends on AT and only im-
plicitly on a8T and a2r for B E O. Therefore we could as well have restricted the
analysis to just one type of consumers having valuations a1T - aTaiT -{- a;aiT and
az, - o!'ra2r -~ a?a2T for firm 1 and firm 2 respectively. Then AT is just alT - azT.
In order to determine a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the location-then-
price game we also have to solve the location stage. This is done in the next section.
4.4 The location stage
In this section we look at the location stage. Given the equilibrium price schemes
(pi,(xl, ~z), psr(xl, ~z)) for r E 7 it is easy to check that, given the locations xl and
~z, the demand for the product of firm i E I in period r is equal to
P;T (~i, ~z)
X 2T (~11 ~z) - (4.4.7)2(~z - xi)
Firm i E I maximizes its total profit, given by
n;(~i, ~z) - 2(~z 1 ~i) ,~
P, (p;T(~i, ~z))z, (4.4.8)
with respect to x;.
Let C- xl f xz and define A- 2{ 'A' -F ~~} and ~- 2{ P~- f P~}. Note that
P1fP2 PIfP2 OlfP2 PIfP7
0 C Az C 20. The number A can be interpreted as the average excess valuation of
the consumers over time for firm 1's product. The number 0 measures the volatility
of these excess valuations. As we see, A and 0 do not depend on the discounting
factors if A1 - Az or pi - pz. If A1 - Az we have that the solution to the location
stage of the model with one period of price competition (pz - 0) is the same as the
solution of the model with two periods of price competition (pz 1 0). If A1 ~ Az and
pl ~ pz locations will depend on the discounting factors.
Given the equilibrium price schemes, the first order conditions for the location
game are
2(xz -~1)z{(2 ~ 4~, - C)(C f 2) - A} - 0
(4.4.9)
2(xz - xl)z{(4 - 4xz ~- C)(4 - C) -~ A} - 0.
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The second order conditions for a maximum are
-2(4 -f- 3~i ~~a) } 0 3 G 0(xz-sl Í
-2(8 -~, - 3~2) f(s~~~)3 c 0.
The system of equations (4.4.9) is solved by xl(C) and xz(C) satisfying
4(C-1)x,(C)-2C2-8Cf6~A
4(C - 1)~2(C) - 2Cz f 4C - 6 - A.
(4.4.10)
(4.4.11)
For (xl(C), ~z(C)) to be an equilibrium of the location game, C must solve
2(xz(C) - ~,(C))2{(2 ~ 4~,(C) - C)(C f 2) - ,A} - 0 - 0. (4.4.12)
For C~ 1 this can be rewritten as
36(C - 1- 6)2{(C - 1)(C - 4)(C ~ 2) ~- 3.A} - 20(C - 1)3 - 0. (4.4.13)
The lefthand side of equation (4.4.13) is a polonomial of degree five and is denoted
by FA(C). In order to guarantee that both firms are in the market we assume that
the degree of vertical differentiation is limited, i.e., the value of „4.r for r E 7 is not
too big.
Assumption 4.4.1 .4T and pT, r E 7, satisfy the condition 0 G 6.
Without loss of generality we restrict ourselves to the situation .4 ~ 0. This
means that for the two-period situation on average consumers (weakly) prefer firm
1's product to firm 2's product. It is still possible, of course, that firm 2's product is
preferred in one of the periods, but this is offset by the same or a stronger (discounted)
preference for firm 1's product in the other period.
Lemma 4.4.2 Under Assumption 4.4.1 all five roots of the equation F,q(C) - 0 are
real. These roots are in the interval (-oo, l~- 12], [1 } i2,1 } i2], [1 ~ iz , 1} ii],
[1 ~ iz , 1~- iz ], and [1 f 12 , oo), respectively.
Proof First note that lirnc.-,-~FA(C) - -oo and lim~-.~FA(C) - oo. Substitu-
tion in equation (4.4.13) yields FA(1 -~ 12) -(.A~12)3(A2~4 -~ 972 - 20), FA(1 }
i2)--2~(A~6)3, F,~(1 f 12 ) -(A~12)3(27A2~4 f 324 - 540), and F,~(1 -~ i2 )-
(A~3)3(AZ - 20). This yields FA(1 -~ 12) 1 0, FA(1 ~- iz ) G 0, FA(1 f i2)? 0, and
FA(1 ~ 12 ) G 0. Because F,~ :(-oo, oo) ~--r )R, is continuous the intermediate value
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theorem says that for each of the intervals there exists a~ in it such that F,~(~) - 0.
O
The bounds for the first and the last interval can be narrowed easily. It is left to
the reader to check that the first root is in the interval [-3,-2] and the fifth root is ín
the interval [3, oo).
In general the roots of the equation FA(C) - 0 can only be determined implicitly.
Lemma 4.4.3 Under Assumption 4..~.1 there eaist L E 1R, M E 1R, e 1 0 aad S 1 0
such that the five roots of the equation FA(C) - 0 are given by Cl - L-e, C2 - L-~e,
C3-M-S, C4-MfS,C5-5f 3 -2M-2L.
Proof See Section 7.
In general it is not possible to give explicit analytical expressions for M, L, e,
and b. Therefore, we have to compute these numbers numerically. For the special
situations A2 - 20 and A- 0 we give analytical expressions in the following two
corollaries. We omit the proof of these corollaries because they can be seen as a direct
consequence of Lemma 4.4.3.
Corollary 4.4.4 Suppose AZ - 20. Then in Le~n.~rca 4.4.3 it holds that L-- 2,
M-5,E2-9~A,andS2-9-A FurtherrrcoreC1GCzCC3GC5CC4.2 4 2 4 2'
For the special situation ,A - 0 we only have three different roots.
Corollary 4.4.5 Suppose A- 0. Then in Lerrem.a 4.4.3 it holds that L- 1- 2(9 ~
0~18)2, M - 1 f 2(9 f 0~18)z, and e2 - ó2 - 4 f o. Furthermore CI C C2 - C3 -
CS c Cq .
Given the values Ck of C that solve (4.4.12), x1(Ck) and x2(Ck) can be determined
from equation ( 4.4.11) for all k E {1, ... , 5}. We distinguish for k E {1, ..., 5}
between the situations Ck - 1 and Ck ~ 1. Note that the situation Ck - 1 is possible
only for A- 0, so C~ ~ 1 for A 1 0.
Lemma 4.4.6 For all k E { 1, ..., 5} such that Ck G 1-F iZ or Ck J 1 f 12 there
does not exist a location equilibrium.
Proof See Section 7.
With the aid of this lemma we can prove the following two propositions.
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Proposition 4.4.7 Under Assumption 4. ~.1 there exists a unique locatíon equilib-
rium for A- 0. This location equilibrium is given by
x. - - i } ~
1 9 3
x2 -
where ~- 2~ 2cos(120 f 3arccos(o - 1)).
Proof See Section 7.
For A- 0 we see that firms' locations are symmetric around z and that they are
outside the unit interval for all possible values of ~. Furthermore we see that if the
volatility increases firms move closer to the center. The situation A- 0 and 0- 0
corresponds to the standard (one period) situation ~- 0, because in that case the
discounting does not matter.
Proposition 4.4.8 Under Assumption !y.l~.1 there exists a unique location equilib-





where cl'' E [0,1] is the unique value for which F,~(1 f 4-12 A) - 0.
Proof See Section 7.
For A~ 0 we see that firms' locations are symmetric around 12f( 24a').A ] 2
Firm 1 can take advantage of its position in the market. If A is relatively high firm 1
will even locate inside the unit interval. For the extreme case A2 - 2~ we find that
~' - 0 so xi --4 f 6 and x2 - 4~ 6. If volatility increases firm 1 moves closer to
the center, whereas firm 2 locates further away from the center.
4.5 Subgame perfect Nash equilibria
In the previous two sections we have derived all ingredients to prove the following
theorem.
Theorem 4.5.1 Under Assumption !.l~.1 there exists a unique subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium for all A for the game in which firms first choose locations and then
compete in prices for two periods.
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Proof For A- 0 we have the equilibrium value C- 1. The solution for the loca-
tion stage is given then by Proposition 4.4.7. For A~ 0 the equilibrium value C
lies between 1 f 12 and 1 f 12. The solution for the location stage is given then
by Proposition 4.4.8. The situation A C 0 holds by symmetry. In all situations
the price stage at time r E 7 is solved by prices according to Proposition 4.3.1.
~
For A - 0 equilibrium profit for both firms equals
. Pi f Pz ~(. ,) ~ 1
B'-BZ- 18
9x2-x,
f2x x' J'( `s - i )
where xi and ~2 are given by Proposition 4.4.7. Profits decrease as volatility increases,
because then both firms locate closer to the center and price competition is stronger.
For A~ 0 firm 1's equilibrium profit equals
Bi - Pi gPs
~(~z -~i)(~i f~2 ~ 2)Z } 2 x'~ x' ~(xi
~- x2 f 2).A~
( z i)
and firm 2's equilibrium profit equals
B2 - Pi gPz
~(~2 - ~i)(4 - ~i - ~2)z -~ 2 ~,~ ~ - (4 - ~i - ~z)A~
( a i)
where xi and x2 are given by Proposition 4.4.8. In order to gain some more insight
in the effects of vertical differentiation on firms' profits, we have summarized some
comparative statics in Table 4.1 for the two extreme cases ,A - 0 and A2 - 2~.
a~; axZ a(xl-rl) a~ an~ a(~1-n~) a(R~}nz)ao ao ao ao ao ao ao
,,4-0 f - - - - 0 -
.42 - 20 -I- f 0 f - -i- f
Table 4.1: Comparative statics.
First consider the situation ,4 - 0. If the volatility increases, both firms adjust
their location symmetrically, i.e., both firms move closer to the center. Clearly, the
degree of differentiation decreases. Price competition let decrease profits for both
firms. Because the firms are symmetric, they have the same profit. Consequently,
aggregate profits decrease as volatility increases.
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Next, consider the situation Az - 20. Note that the one period model (pz - 0)
also gives rise to this situation. Firm 1, being preferred on average, is able to take
advantage of its position in the market. Firm 1 will locate closer to the center and
firm 2 will locate further from the center in order to soften price competition. The
degree of differentiation remains unchanged. Consequently, firm 1 has higher profits
than firm 2. If volatility increases these effects even get stronger. Aggregate profits
however are increasing with volatility.
4.6 An example
In this section we look at an example where sign(Al)- -sign(Az). For simplicity let
p1 - pz - 1, which means that A- ,.41 ~ Az and 0 - Ai f Az. If we take A- 0,
then A1 --Az and 0- 2Ai. Using Proposition 4.3.1 and Proposition 4.4.7, we
are able to calculate the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome. In Table 4.2 we
have listed the values of A, 0, ~ for different values of A1 and ,.4z. In Table 4.3 we
have given the corresponding equilibrium outcomes xi~ ~á~ Pii~ Pzi~ piz~ Piz.
AI Az A 0 ~
-0.50 0.50 0 0.5000 0.0285
-0.25 0.25 0 0.1250 0.0070
0.00 0.00 0 0.0000 0.0000
0.25 -0.25 0 0.1250 0.0070
0.50 -0.50 0 0.5000 0.0285
Table 4.2: Parameter values for A- 0.
From these tables we see that firms' locations are closer the greater the volatility
0 is. In case the volatility is equal to zero, the standard outcome results in which
both firms charge the same prices. If volatility is greater than zero, firms' prices differ.
The firm selling the on average more (less) attractive commodity for the consumers,
is able to set a higher (lower) price than in the standard situation. A way to describe
the oscillating development of ,AT over time as is shown in these tables is to take
ai, - a2r - -(ai7 - a2r) - 2, r E 7, and ai f a2 - 1, i.e., to have both the
valuation differences and the consumer fractions oscillating over time. If we take this
specification we can calculate the locations of the indifferent consumers over time to be
as in Table 4.4, which gives some idea of the composition of demand over the different
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A1 ~i ~s Pii - Psz Piz - Psi
-0.50 -0.2405 1.2405 1.3143 1.6477
-0.25 -0.2477 1.2477 1.4120 1.5787
0.00 -0.2500 1.2500 1.5000 1.5000
0.25 -0.2477 1.2477 1.5787 1.4120
0.50 -0.2405 1.2405 1.6477 1.3143
Table 4.3: Equilibrium locations and prices for A- 0.
types. The demand itself in period r E T does not depend on this specification, but
only depends on A7.
In Table 4.4 we have given the corresponding equilibrium values of xi~~ ~z~~ Xii~
X21, Xiz, X2z, IIi, II2. Furthermore xi' - 1- xz' and ~2" - 1-~i'. We see that the
demand a firm has in a certain period is higher the greater the fraction of consumers
for which the product of that firm is more attractive than the other firm's product.
Because the average valuation oscillates, also the firms' demands oscillate.
Ai i,~i i.~z Xii - Xsz Xiz - Xzi Bi - Bz
-0.50 0.7813 0.5563 0.4437 0.5563 1.49976
-0.25 0.7229 0.6115 0.4721 0.5279 1.49999
0.00 0.6667 0.6667 0.5000 0.5000 1.50000
0.25 0.6115 0.7229 0.5279 0.4721 1.49999
0.50 0.5563 0.7813 0.5563 0.4437 1.49976
Table 4.4: Equilibrium demands and profits for A- 0.
As noted before profits are maximal in case volatility is zero. The equilibrium
locations are -4 and 4 then. When volatility is greater than zero, the per period
profits differ over firms. The reason is that firm 1 has a product that is preferred
on average in period 1, whereas firm 2 has a product that is preferred on average in
period 2.
The situation becomes more interesting if we change the situation A - 0 to A 1 0.
With Proposition 4.3.1 and Proposition 4.4.8 we can calculate the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium outcome then. In case A- 4 the results can be found in Tables
4.5, 4.6, and 4.7. We see that firms' profits differ and furthermore firm 1's profit is
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maximal in case volatility is minimal, whereas firm 2's profit is higher in case volatility
is maximal. The total surplus that firms attract from the consumers is higher than
in the competitive case.
A, Az A 0 a!'
-0.2500 0.5000 0.25 0.3125 0.028063
-0.0625 0.3125 0.25 0.1016 0.006978
0.1250 0.1250 0.25 0.0313 0.000000
0.3125 - 0.0625 0.25 0.1016 0.006978
0.5000 -0.2500 0.25 0.3125 0.028063
i ~i
.
xz Pii Pái Piz Páz
-0.2500 -0.2033 1.2861 1.4472 1.5317 1.6972 1.2817
-0.0625 -0.2071 1.2903 1.5181 1.4767 1.6431 1.3517
0.1250 -0.2083 1.2917 1.5833 1.4167 1.5833 1.4167
0.3125 -0.2071 1.2903 1.6431 1.3517 1.5181 1.4767
0.5000 -0.2033 1.2861 1.6972 1.5317 1.4472 1.5317
A1 Xii X21 Xiz Xzz ~i ~2
-0.2500 0.4858 0.5142 0.5697 0.4303 1.6700 1.3390
-0.0625 0.5069 0.4931 0.5486 0.4514 1.6710 1.3382
0.1250 0.5278 0.4722 0.5278 0.4722 1.6713 1.3380
0.3125 0.5486 0.4514 0.5069 0.4931 1.6710 1.3382
0.5000 0.5697 0.4303 0.4858 0.5142 1.6700 1.3390
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4.7 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 4.4.3
Because the equation F,~(C) - 0 has five real roots it is possible to construct two pairs
of symmetric roots. We denote these roots as Cl - L- e, CZ - L-~ e, C3 - M- b,
C4 - M f b. The remaining root equals C5 - 5 f 3 - 2M - 2L then. After some
tedious calculations we get FA(C) - 36C5-(180-f 12A)C'-I-(A2~-48Af36-20)C3~
(612 ~-144A - 3A2 ~60) C2 -(42Az f 384A f 792~ 6~ ) C f(3A3 f 44A2 f 204,Af 288 -}-
20) - 0. Next we define GA(C) - 36(C - Cl)(C - C2)(C - C3)(C - C4)(C - CS).
Rewriting yields Gd(C) - 36{C5 -(5 f A~3)C4 f ry3C3 f ry2C2 f 71C ~- -yo}, with
ryo -(L2M2 - L262 - M2e2 f e2b2)(-5 - A~3 ~- 2M f 2L), -yl -(2Lê2 ~- 2Me2 -
2LM2 - 2ML2)(-5 - A~3 -I- 2M f 2L) -f (L2M2 - L2b2 - M2e2 f ez62), ry2 -(M2 -~
4ML ~ L2 - e2 - ó2)(-5 - A~3 f 2M -~ 2L) ~- (2Ló2 f 2Me2 - 2LM2 - 2ML2), and
y3 -(-2M - 2L)(-5 - A~3 f 2M f 2L) -h (M2 f 4ML f L2 - eZ - b2). Comparing
F,~(C) and GA(C) shows that F,~(C) - GA(C) for L, M, e and b satisfying
(i) ry3 - A2 f 48A -~ 36 - 2~
(ii) ry2 - 612 f 144A - 3A2 ~- 60
(iii) ryl - -42A2 - 384A - 792 - 60
(iv) ryo - 3A3 f 44A2 f 204..4 -~ 288 -}- 2~.
Note that the existence of an L, M, e, and b satisfying conditions ( i) to (iv) is guar-
anteed for any feasible A and 0 because the equation F,~(C) - 0 has five real roots.
Proof of Lemma 4.4.6
It is clear that there only exists a location equilibrium if the second order conditions
for both firms are satisfied. We will show that for Ck C 1-1- 12 and Ck ~ 1 f 1z the
second order conditions are not satisfied for both firms. From (4.4.10) we see that
the second order conditions for a maximum are given by
2(~1(C) -~z(C))3(4 f 3x,(C) -h xz(C)) f 0 ~ 0
2(x,(C) - x2(C))3(8 - x,(C) - 3x2(C)) f 0 c 0
for firm 1 and firm 2, respectively. With the help of equation (4.7.17) we can rewrite
these conditions as Sl(C) C 0 and S2(C) G 0 where
S~(C) - 2(s~c ~~ - 3)3(1 t 2C f 2~~ 11) f 0
SZ(C) - 2(z~c i~ - 3)3(5 - 2C f 2~~ ,~) f 0.
If we take the sum of Sl(C) and SZ(C) which should be smaller than or equal to zero,
then it is easy to deduce the first part of the proposition. Next we look at the second
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part of the proposition. Note that Sr(C) 1 0 for C G -2 because both 2~~ tl - 3
and 1 f 2C -}- 2~~ 11 are negative then. Furthermore for C) 3, SZ(C) J 0, because~
both 21~ 11 - 3 G 0 and 5- 2C ~- ZlC 11 G 0. It is easy to see that C- 4 f 9}a ~
solves 5- 2C f 21~ ~l - 0. For C 1'~- 9}9A f it holds that 5- 2C ~- 21~ 11 c 0.
From Assumption 4.4.1 we furthermore know that 4-}- 9}4A ~ G 3. But this is what
we wanted to prove, because the root in the interval [1 ~ 12 , oo) is always greater
than 3.
Proof of Proposition 4.4.7
According to Lemma 4.4.6 the only remaining equilibrium candidate for A- 0 is
Ck - 1 for some k E{ 1, ..., 5}. Denote ~- 1- s. Then equation (4.4.12) can be
rewritten as
~,(Ck)3 - ~x,(Ck)2 -~ is - 0. (4.7.14)
After substituting ~1(Ck) - y f 4 we have
3 3 2~, - 1
y - 16y ~ 32 - 0~
(4.7.15)
Assumption 4.4.1 implies ~(~C - 1) G 0, so the roots for equation (4.7.15) are
yl - 2cos(3), yz - zcos(3 ~- 120), y3 - 2cos(~ f 240), (4.7.16)
where ~-arctan(2 "-"~ ~) for ~) Z on the condition that ~ E[90,180] andi-s,.
~-arccos(1 - 2~) for p C 2 on the condition that ~ E[0, 90].3 One can check
that the specification of ~ can be reduced to ~-arccos(1 - 2y,) for all ~ E[0,1] on
the condition that ~ E[0, 180]. For ~- 0 we have yl - y3 - 4 and y2 --2. For
more details about the derivations we refer the reader to Uspensky (1948).
There is only an equilibrium when ~(~c - 1) c 0, i.e., 0 C 0 G 6. If the consumers'
preference for one of the firms is very large, there cannot be an equilibrium where both
firms are in the market. Note that this is equivalent to the condition in Assumption
3Without Assumption 4.4.1 the situation p(p - 1) ~ 0 can occur. Then the real root ís
yi-{1-2~-F 1(l~({~-1))f}lf{1-2F~- 1(l~(F~-1))~}f.64 32 64 32
But then xl(C) ~ 3~4 and xp(C) G 1~4, which contradicts Assumption 4.2.1. For the situation
C- 1 we thus essentially do not need Assumption 4.9.1.
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4.4.1. For all 0 G~, G 1 it holds according to (4.7.16) that y2 G y3 G yl. For
0 C~. G 2 we have y2 E[-2 J3, -2], y3 E[-2, 0], and yl E[0, 2]. For 2 G~ G 1 we
have y2 E[-2~3,0],y3 E[0, 2], and yl E[2, 2J3]. Then xz(C) - x1(C) - 2- 2y is
minimal for y2 and prices are maximal. Because XlT - XZr - 2 in all three situations,
profits for both firms are maximized for y- y2. One may check that the second order
conditions for a maximum for both firms are indeed satisfied for y- y2.
With ~- 2-~ 2cos(~ -{-120) where ~ as before, the unique solution for the location
stage is given by (~i,~Z) - (- 4 ~- ~, 4 - ~).
Proof of Proposition 4.4.8






Lemma 4.4.6 says that 1 f 1z G C G 1 f 12 , so there are two equilibrium candidates.
Write C- 1 -}- ~ with q E [2, 4]. Note that Assumption 4.2.1 requires that q 1 2.
What we will prove first is that q 1 3 at an equilibrium. Next we show that the
situation 3 C q c 4 provides us with the unique equilibrium stated in the proposition.
Substitution of (4.7.17) in (4.4.9) yields
~ - C2 - 2C - 8 f 3A (4.7.18)
2(x2 - x,)~ (C - 1).
From the fact that C 1 1 it follows that the second order condition for firm 2
is automatically fulfilled if the second order condition for firm 1 is fulfilled. After
rewriting, equation ( 4.4.10) then reduces to
2(~2 ~~1)2 G 15 - 6C f A-(
2(C - 1) )2~
(4.7.19)
If we substitute C- 1~~ into equations ( 4.7.18) and (4.7.19) we get a system
of equations in q given by
~ - ~ 2 36 -




The question now is what value of q E ( 2, 4] satisfies ( 4.7.20). Define
T(q)-(92)zf39 -18-Afq2 fqs.
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The derivative of T with respect to q satisfies aT q -~~ A- 3s - 3~ as ~ iz -aq ~z z q q ~z z
is - s C 0 and furthermore T(2) ~ 0 and T(4) G 0. But then there exists a unique Q
for which T(Q) - 0 and for all q ) Q it holds that T(q) C 0. Because T(1 ~~) 1 0,
the relevant interval for q is the interval [1 ~- f, 4].
The derivative of firm 1's total profit with respect to q is equal to
aII,(g) qA A(g - 1) 18 A2 0
aq - (3 ~ 12 )( 2q ~ qz ) ~ 12 - 3(q - 2)z
and the derivative of firm 2's total profit with respect to q is equal to
(4.7.21)
8IIz(q) - ( 3 - qA)(A(1 - q) } 18) ~ Az - ~ (4.7.22)
óq - 12 2q qz 12 3(q - 2)z~
Because a a'Q 1 a áQ9 ~ 0 the relevant interval for q is the interval [3,4].
The only thing remained to show is that for all A and 0 the unique value of
q E[3, 4] that solves the first equation of (4.7.20), say q', also satisfies the second
equation of (4.7.20), or equivalently that T(q') G 0.
If A is relatively low, i.e., A C 4(f - 1), then it is easy to see that 'l(q) G 0 for
all q E [3,4], so obviously for g'. If A is relatively high, i.e., A~ 4(~- 1), then
T(3) 1 0, so we need to check if q' will be high enough to satisfy (4.7.20). In order
to do this we first define
S(q) - 2 (3 - 6~9)z C(92 )z ~ 3q - 9J . (4.7.23)
The derivative of S with respect to q is equal to
áS(q) - 324 108 3qAzaq 4(3 - 6Iq) ( Q3 - qz ~ 144 ). (4.7.24)
Furthermore the condition ~ C 6 guarantees that
z
144 ~ 9 C(3 - 6~q)z
f 9- 46 . (4.7.25)
But then
3qAz 324 108 3 3 36 324 108f---c- f9-- f---c0144 q3 qz q ( 3 - 6~9)z 9 9s qz -
because a
324 - 216q f 27qz f q ~ 405 - 216q f 27qz c 0
(4 - 2)z -
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for all q E [3, 4]. This means that S is decreasing in q on the interval [3, 4]. From this
we can derive that for A~ 4(f - 1) it holds that q` ) 3.5. But then we know that
indeed the second order conditions for a maximum are fulfilled because T(3.5) C 0.
If we substitute C- 1 f~ and a' - 4- q' into equation (4.7.17) we get the result
stated in the proposition.
Chapter 5
A Generalized Circular Model
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we present a variant of the Salop (1979) model of spatial compe-
tition in which a finite number of firms compete in prices. There are two types of
vertically differentiated consumers, uniformly distributed over a circular city, with
possibly different densities. The firms are of possibly two difFerent types and are lo-
cated symmetrically along the circle. Consumer types differ with respect to both their
valuations for the products of the firms and their unit transportation cost. Each con-
sumer buys one unit of the mutually exclusive commodities from the firm that offers
the highest indirect utility. The indirect utility function of a consumer incorporates
both transportation costs and vertical differentiation aspects.
We show that there is a unique Nash equilibrium with both firms active in both
markets for the game in which the firms choose prices simultaneously. When all firms
are of the same type, valuations do not matter, and all firms charge the same price
in equilibrium. Consequently, demand and profit are the same for all firms. Profits
are decreasing in the number of firms. Furthermore, profits are increasing in the
unit transportation cost, because then overall competition is relaxed. When there are
two different types of firms, valuations do matter. In this case aggregate profits are
increasing in the relative excess valuation. The per firm profit, however, decreases for
one type of firm and increases for the other type of firm.
The model with two different types of consumers being located along the same
circle has a formally equivalent representation with the different types of consumers
being located with density one along circles with different perimeters.
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For the case with valuations equal to zero, we demonstrate that the familiar result
that free entry is characterized by too many firms compared to the social optimum
may be invalid if the unit transportation cost differs between the two types of con-
sumers. Competition for one type of consumers may drive prices and demands down
too much, such that the fixed costs cannot be covered at the social optimum.
Finally, we show that for the case with valuations equal to zero, there is a unique
Nash equilíbrium for the game in which two firms simultaneously choose prices when
the consumers have a reservation price. The reservation price specifies how much a
consumer is willing to pay for the commodity. Our approach is constructive compared
to the approach of Boyer and Moreaux (1993) for the linear modelr. Our result
includes the result for the 'standard' circular or linear model, i.e., the model with
valuations equal to zero and without differences in unit transportation cost.
This chapter is based on Webers (1995) and is organized as follows. In Section 2
the model is presented. Section 3 states the Nash equilibria for the game in which
the firms simultaneously set prices. In Section 4 we look at entry from a normative
point of view. Section 5 discusses equilibrium pricing in a simplified version of the
model from Section 2, but now the consumers' reservation price may restrict firms'
strategy sets. The proofs are gathered in Section 6.
5.2 The model
There is a continuum of consumers distributed uniformly with density one along a
circle with perimeter one. A fraction aB of them is of type B E O-{1,2}. The type
1 and type 2 consumers will be referred to as the young and the old, respectively.
As in Salop (1979), there are n firms in the market, located symmetrically along the
circle. These firms are indexed i E I-{1, ..., n}. The young and the old differ with
respect to their valuations for the quality of a certain product offered by each of the
firms. The non-negative number aB denotes the valuation of a type B E O consumer
for the product of firm i E I. Real income for consumers of both types is given by
w. Firm í E 1 is located at ~; -`nr and sells the commodity at price p; E 1Rf. For
n odd symmetry requires that all firms are of the same type, i.e., ae - ae for i E I
and B E 0. For n even we assume that there are possibly two types of firms that are
located symmetrically and alternate along the circle.
1Moreover their result (Proposition I in the paper) is not completely correct. Although they end
up with the cotrect equilibrium prices, the price reaction functions are false for large reservation
prices.
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Without loss of generality firms of type 1 may be indexed i E Il -{ 1, 3, ..., n-1 }
and firms of type 2 may be indexed i E I2 -{2, 4, ..., n}. The distance between firms
of the same type is n then. Furthermore aB - aB for i E Il and B E O, and ae - a2
for i E I2 and B E 0. Each type B E 0 consumer buys one unit of the commodity
from the firm that offers the highest indirect utility, for firm i E I at price p; being
given by
VB(~~11i) - w -pi -~ ae - t(~~~i) (5.2.1)
where ~ E[0,1~ is the consumer's location. The number t(x, x;) is the transportation
cost for shipping the product of firm i to this consumer's location. We assume this
transportation cost to be linear in distance, with unit cost tB E 1Rff for consumers
of type 8 E O, i.e., t(x,x;) - tB min{~~ - x;~, l - ~~ -~i~} for B E O. There are two
different market areas, namely one for each B E O. The market area of the product
of firm i E I for the consumers of type 9 E O is given by
M~lpli... ipn) - j~ E[~i 1~ I VB(~ipi) i VB(2ipi)i~ ~ Z}i
i.e., the set of type B consumers that prefer the commodity of firm i to the commodity
of all other firms.
The demand X; (pl, ..., pn) for the commodity of firm i E I at prices pl, ..., pn is
the sum of the demands of both types of consumers for the commodity of firm i and
is given by
Xi(pl, . . . , pn) - ~ ~Bdx, for i E I. (5.2.2)
BEO MB~Pi,...,P~)
By definition, the sum of the commodity demands equals one. For i E I, the
location of the type B E 0 consumer indifferent between buying from firm i and
buying from firm i~- 1 is given by
g ~i ~~itl pi}1 - pi a~ - Q~tl
xi,~fl(Pi,pitl) - 2 ~ 2tB } 2tB ,
(5.2.3)
being the midpoint between the firms' locations corrected for price differences and
possible consumers' valuation differences, where for k E {0, n f 1} we define pk -
B B n}1-2kp~n-k~, dk - a~n-k~, and xk - xln-kI - n}1 '
Under the assumption that the consumers' valuation differences and the price
differences are not too large, all firms will sell their products to both the young and
the old. For ease of notation we will write ~B,i}1 -~e.;tl(pi, p;fl).
From equations (5.2.2) and (5.2.3) it then follows
Xilple...,pn) -~ aB(~B,ifl - xB-1 i), for i E I, (5.2.4)
BEO
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which means that firm i's market share is a weighted sum of the distance between
the locations of the two indifferent consumers of both types, the weights being their
fractions in the population. Substitution of equation (5.2.3) into equation (5.2.4)
yields
1 cxe
Xi(pi,...,pn) - ~ ~ ~ 2tB(ptti -~ p~-i - 2pt ~- 2a8 - aeti - aa-1). (5.2.5)
BEO
Given prices, the profit of firm i E I is equal to
n~(pl,...,pn) -Ï)iXi(pl,...,pn). (5.2.6)
Costs are assumed to be normalized to zero. We look for a Nash equilibrium for
the game in which the firms simultaneously choose prices as to maximize their profit.
The price game is solved by prices pi, ..., pn satisfying
ni(Pi,...,P[-i~p,,ptti,...,Pn) ~ n~(Pi,...,P~-i,p[,Ptfi,...,Pn) (5.2.7)
for all p; E 1EZ~ and i E I.
The model as described here has a mathematically equivalent representation,
which may be more useful in some circumstances.
Proposition 5.2.1 Any circular model as specifaed above, where both types of con-
sumers are distributed with different densities along one circle, has a mathematically
equivalent representation, where both types of consumers are distributed with density
one along two circles with different perimeters.
Proof See Section 6.
5.3 Nash equilibria
In this section we look at the Nash equilibria for the price game. The number A-
~aEe ~(ae - a2) measures the relative excess valuation for firms of type 1 compared
to firms of type 2. A positive value of A means that firms of type 1 are relatively
preferred to firms of type 2, which gives firms of type 1 a competitive advantage. A
negative value of r4 means that firms of type 2 are relatively preferred to firms of type
1, which gives firms of type 2 a competitive advantage. For A- 0, which includes
the case that all firms are of the same type, no firm has a competitive advantage.
In order to guarantee that both types of firms are in the market we assume that
the degree of vertical differentiation is limited.
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Assumption 5.3.1 The number A satisfies the condition ~A~ C n.
The solution for the price game is given in Theorem 5.3.2.
Theorem 5.3.2 For all ,A satisfying Assvmption 5.~?.1 there ezists a unique Nash
equilibriam with both firms active in both markets for the game in which firms compete
in prices. When there are two types of firms, the game is solved by prices








When ald firms are of the same type, the game is solved by prices
i z -1
p` -( tl ~ t2 ) `nI ~
for i E 1.
Proof See Section 6.
Firms selling the product for which on average the consumers have a stronger
preference, are able to set a higher price than the other firms do (see also Perloff and
Salop (1985)).
When there are two types of firms, equilibrium profits are
Qr 4!2 -1
II; - ~ ~1 ~ ~2 ~
~' a~ -'
II; - ~ t~ f ~~ ~
for i E II, (5.3.8)
for i E Iz. (5.3.9)
For given ae and te, B E O, the profit of firm i E I is increasing in ,A for i E Il
and decreasing in A for i E I2. Aggregate profits, however, are increasing in ,A. The
increase in profits realized by the firms of the relatively preferred type, more than
compensates the decrease in profits realized by the firms of the other type. When all
firms are of the same type or A- 0, equilibrium profits are
al a2 -I 1 2
1T` -~ tl ~ t2 ~ ( n) , for i E 1. (5.3.10)
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In case all firms are of the same type or A- 0, profits decrease with the number
of firms, n, and increase with any of the unit transport costs because then price com-
petition is relaxed. Most interesting is the effect of oB on profits. When consumers of
type B E 0 have the lowest unit transportation cost profits decrease with aB, because
then price competition is increased. When consumers of type 9 E O have the highest
unit transportation cost profits increase with ~B, because then price competition is
relaxed. We have summarized these latter results in Table 5.1.











i E I f f syn(tl - t2) sgn(t2 - tl) -
Table 5.1: Comparative statics of marginal profit in case ae - aZ for B E O.
5.4 A normative view on entry
For the generalized circular model introduced in Section 2 we study the entry decision
from a normative point of view, i.e., we compare the free entry situation with the
social planner situation. For the standard circular model we know that under free
entry there are too many firms in relation to the social optimum (see for example
Tirole (1988)). For firms the 'social' incentive for savings in transportation costs is
less important than the 'private' incentive to obtain a market share while still being
able to impose a mark-up. For the generalized circular model this result no longer
holds through. It is possible now that the private and the social incentive coincide or
that there are too few firms under free entry.
To simplify the analysis, we assume that all firms are of the same type, which
means that only the number n of firms is relevant. The cost of entry is fixed and is
denoted by f.
The number of firms that enter under free entry (which depends on al), denoted
by n`(al), can be determined from the zero profit condition for the existing firms.
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This yields
r 1 1 -z
n`(al )- 1 f( tl ~ 1 t2a )~ . (5.4.11)
The number of firms selected by`a social planner, n'(al), equals the value of n
that minimizes the sum of the fixed costs and the consumers' transportation costs.
The social planner thus minimizes
f ~ f ~
nf~- al(2nt1 J ~n xdx) -}- (1 - al)(2nt2 J ~~ xd~)0 0
with respect to n. The first term counts the fixed costs of entry, the second term
represents the transportation costs consumers of type 1 face, and the third term
represents the transportation costs consumers of type 2 face. The number of firms
the social planner chooses equals
~-~ ii ( i)s`z
n'(a')
a t -~ 4f a t ll
(5.4.12)
Using equations (5.4.11) and (5.4.12) it is straightforward to derive the following
result.
Proposition 5.4.1 For the generalized circular model, there may be too many or too
few firms under free entry, compared to the social optimum.
Proof See Section 6.
The by now familiar result that free entry is characterized by too many firms
compared to the social optimum need no longer be true if the unit transportation cost
differs over the two types of consumers. When one of the unit transportation cost is
relatively too low or relatively too high and the fractions al and a2 are relatively close,
there are too few firms under free entry, compared to the social optimum. Although
the social optimum minimizes the total transportation costs it cannot do anything
about the difFerences in unit transportation cost over consumers.
Note that for al - 0 or al - 1 we have the standard circular model outcome
n`(al) - 2n'(al), i.e., free entry is characterized by too many firms. This result is
due to the fact that the equilibrium price is linearly increasing in the transportation
cost, so the number of firms under free entry is increasing in the transportation cost.
For 0 c a' c 1 we may have that free entry is characterized by too few firms if
tl ~ t2. The reason is that for fixed t' the equilibrium price is bounded from above
for increasing values of t2 and hence the number of firms under free entry is bounded
from above.
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5.5 The effect of reservation prices
In this section we consider the model from Section 2 with two firms, i.e., n- 2
and I- {1,2}. We assume that valuations aB are zero for all B E O and i E
I, i.e., the qualities of the product offered by the firms do not play a role in the
consumers' decisions. Recall that firm i E 1 is located at x; - 'zl. Consumers of
type B E 0 face a linear transportation cost with unit cost tB E R.~~. Furthermore
each consumer has reservation price p for the transportation cost and price charged
by any of the two firms, i.e., each consumer wants to pay up to an amount p for the
product. Consequently, both firms' strategy space will be restricted to P-[0, p]. The
reservation price is assumed to be given exogenously. It may happen for a consumer
that the price and the transportation cost are so high that the reservation price cannot
cover these. To describe this we give the following definition.
Definition 5.5.1 For firm i E I, the potential market area of consumers of type
B E O at price pt E ~, denoted by MB(p;), is the set of locations of consumers of type
B, for which the sum of the transportation cost and the price p; charged by firm í does
not exceed the reservation price p.
More formally, MB(pl) -{x E [0, 1] ~ pl -~ tex C p or pl -~ te(1 - x) G p} and
M2(p2) -{x E [0, 1] ~ p2 f te(2 - x) C p or p2 f te(x - 2) G p} for B E O. As in
Gabszewicz and Thisse (1986), the notion of potential markets is used to describe the
structure of competition among the two firms. We distinguish between three different
situations.
Definition 5.5.2 At given prices, there is strong competition, at these prices, if the
potential market areas for the two firms have a non-empty intersection for both types
of consumers. There is weak competition, at given prices, if the potential market areas
for the firms have a non-empty intersection for one of the two types of consumers and
for the other type the intersection is either a point or empty. There is no competition,
at given prices, if the potential market areas for the firms have an intersection which
is either a point or empty for óoth types of consumers.
For firm i E 1, the size of the potential market area of consumers of type B E O
at price p; is the total length of the interval of consumers of type B for which the sum
of the transportation cost to firm i and the price of firm i, p;, does not exceed the
reservation price p. For firm i E I, at prices pl and p2, the minimum of the sizes of the
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potential market area and the competitive market area of consumers of type B E O is
denoted by XB(pl,pz). The demand X;(pl,pz) for firm i E I, at prices pl and pz, is
equal to ~BEO XB(pl,pz). Note that the consumers of type B E 0, indifferent between
buying from firm 1 or buying from firm 2, are located at 4~ 2i ' and 9-~~-.
Without loss of generality we assume that tl G tz. It is easy to verify that the
situation of no competition occurs for p C'~~ ~- 4, the situation of weak competition
occurs for '~~ f 4 G p C ' 2 Z f 9, and, the situation of strong competition occurs
forp~ '22~-4. -
For p C'~~ -f 4, we have the situation of no competition. The demand of firm
i E I is given then by
i (2(P~1 p~)1 } az ~2(P~z
p')IX~(pi, pz) - a
l l
For ' 2 Z~- `4 C p C ' 2 2 f 4, we have the situation of weak competition, where
the firms compete for the consumers of type Bl. The demand of firm i~ j E I is
given then by
Xi(pi,pz) - a - ~- ~- c~
~`2 p; tl p;~ z `2(Ptz p4)1
Finally, for p 1 'z~-~- 4, we have the situation of strong competition. The
demand of firm i~ j E I is given then by
Xt(pi,pz) - al (1 f
P~ -ptl f az ~I -~ p~ -pil .2 t' l `2 t2 l
Given the prices pl and pz, the profit of firm i E I is equal to
B~(pi,pz) -p;X~(pi,pa). (5.5.13)
The price game is solved by prices pi E P, p2 E P such that
Bi(Pi~Ps) ~ nl(pl~pz)
Bz(Pi,Pz) ~ Bz(pi,pz)
for all pl E P and pz E 7~. Because firms are located symmetrically it makes sense to
look for an equilibrium in which both firms choose the same prices.
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Theorem 5.5.3 There ezists a unique symmetric Nash equidibrium for the game in
which two firms compete in prices and consumers have reservation price p. The game
is solved by prices pi - p2 - p", with
2 if 0
t~
P - 4 zf P1
P` - 2~ ti ~- 922~ ~-I ~~1 } 4~~ Z.f Pz
t2
P - 4 Z.f P3











- t~ t1 4aZt1}3att~ t2 ( 2(1}a~)il}alt2 22 1 al
- y i P2 - y~qaztl}zait~ ~i P3 - 2 ` 4a~t1}2alt~ ~i P9 - q~ 2~ ti
Proof See Section 6.
sÍ-1.
Note that 0 C pl C pz C Ps C Pa, and, that the values of pz, p3i and p4 depend
on al and oz. When the reservation price is relatively high, i.e., p 1 p9, the result of
Theorem 5.5.3 is equivalent to the result of Theorem 5.3.2. For the special situation
t' - tz, which includes the standard circular model, equilibrium prices are given by
P if 0 C-G t'2 P - 2
~J' - p- 4 lf 2 C p C 34'
2 if 34~ G p.
In Figure 5.1 the equilibrium price p' is plotted as a function of the reservation
price p for three different values of ol. In this figure t' - 1 and tz - 2. If the
reservation price p is rather low, p C 2, both firms charge the monopoly price 2. If
the reservation price p is rather high, p~ 2~ Ifa„ both firms charge the competitive
price 1}a, . For txl E{0,1} there are only two kinks, whereas for 0 C~1 G 1 there
are four kinks.
Next we look at the firms' demands and profits in equilibrium. In equilibrium the
demand of both firms is given by
~ ~i f iá }7~
tl r a~ az
X. - Z ` tl ~ t2 ~
2a2t~}a~t~ al 2a2p


























Figure 5.1: Equilibrium price p' in case t' - 1 and tz - 2.
In equilibrium the profit of both firms is given by
a' ~' S~L( ti ~ tz ) z
2(a1 }aZ)(p-4)
7- 7 tltz(zaztltaltz)r a1 I 2azp 211~ - (4a2t1}á1t212 ` 2 T t2 )
z
z~P- á)











It is easy to check that profits are continuous and non-decreasing in p. Note that
equilibrium profits do not depend on a' and az in case t' - tz.
In Figure 5.2 equilibrium demand is plotted as a function of the reservation price
p for three different values of al, where tl - 1 and tz - 2. Demand equals (1 f al)2
i~ i i ~1 a~tza~~ i ~1 ifor 0 C p C 2 , 4 for 2 C p G 2~ 4, 4-za, for z f 4 C p C 1, and, 2 for p 1 1.
In Figure 5.3 equilibrium profits are plotted as a function of the reservation price p
for three difFerent values of a', where t' - 1 and tz - 2. For values of the reservation
price smaller than 1, profits are increasing in al. For values of the reservation price
greater than 1, profits are non-increasing in a'. For p- 1 profits do not depend on
al
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X'












Proof of Proposition 5.2.1 Consider the situation where a fraction aB of the con-
sumers of type 8 E 0 is located uniformly along a circle with perimeter aB E Rtt
with density one. Firms are located symmetrically which means that for each B E O
firm i E I is located at aBx; along the circle with perimeter aB. Consumers of type
B E O have unit transportation cost equal to tB -~. With equations (5.2.3) and
(5.2.4) the demand of firm i E I can be written as
1 1
n } ~ 2tB (P;fi -F p;-i - 2P; -I- 2ae - ae~l - aB-i ), (5.6.14)
BEO
which is equivalent to (5.2.5), because tB -~ for all B E O.
Proof of Theorem 5.3.2
According to equations (5.2.5) and (5.2.6) firm i's profit is equal to
1 aB B e e
p' (n ~ ~ 2tB (~;fi
f p;-i - 2p; -F 2a; - a;~l - ai-1) . (5.6.15)
BEO
Note that for all i E I, aBfl - ae-1. The profit maximizing price for firm i E I can
be written then as
( )-
P;-i f P;fi 1~ar a~~-~ ~ 1 ~ aB e a~.
P; P;-t,P;fi 4 f 2 tl ~- ~2 n f tB (a; fl - a~ )
BEO
When there are two types of firms, we have that ae - aB for all i E I~, and, ae - a2
for all i E I2. This yields
P;-i f p;fi 1(al a2~-1 1
P;(P;-i,P;fi) - 4 ~ 2 I` tl -~ t2 (n f A) , for i E li, (5.6.16)
and
p;-i f P;ti 1 al a2 -~ 1
p'(1~`-1'p'tl) - 4 ~ 2( t~ ~ tz ) (n - A) ~
for i E I2. (5.6.17)
Solving equations (5.6.16) and (5.6.17) gives as a solution
al a2 -' ( 1 A
p`-(t'}t2) `n}3)~foriEll,
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- ~al azl-1 (1 A
P` tl } tz J ln - 3~'
for i E Iz.
To see that this is the unique equilibrium outcome consider the system of equations
induced by equations (5.6.16) and (5.6.17).
Define cl - 2 ~ ~; -~ ~2 ) -1 ~ n ~- A) and cz - z ~ a;' -h a; ) 1 ~'-n - A) . Recall that
~ is even in case there are two types of firms, and denote po -(Pl, ..., pn-1) and
pE - (pz, . . . , pn). Furthermore, let co - (cl, . . . , cl) E 1R2 and cE - (cz, . . . , cz) E
]R2 . Then the system of equations can be written as Hp - c, where p- (po, pE)T,
c - (co,cE)T and
FT I~ ~
H-LIZ FJ
with F the 2 x 2 matrix with components f;~, for i, j E{1, ... , 2}, given by
E1i E {1,..., "-}2
di E {1,...,2 - 1}
for i - 2
otherwise.
Define cE - cE f Zco. Then, rewriting the system Hp - c yields a reduced system
Hp - c, where c- (co, cE)T and
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di E {1,..., 2 - 1}
`di E {1,...,2 -1}
for i - 2
otherwise.
Because GcÉ ~ 0 and cÉ 1 0, there exists a unique, non-negative, solution to the
system GpE - cÉ for each cÉ ? 0(see Theorem 9.1 in Gale (1960, p. 296)). This
solution is pÉ - 3cÉ. Because all even prices are the same it is easy to see that also
all odd prices have to be the same, which proves the uniqueness.
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When all firms are of the same type it is easy to see that equation (5.6.15) reduces
to
B
Y~ n-~ ~ 2tB (p,ti
f p~-i - 2p;) .
BEO
(5.6.18)
The profit maximizing price for firm i E 1 can be written then as
P:-i -b p;}i 1~al a21
1
Ps(P;-i,Ptti) - 4 ~ 2n t? } ts ll
For firm i E I this yields an equilibrium price given by
i a -1
p`-(t' }t2) (n)~foriEl.
Proof of Proposition 5.4.1
Let n`(al) and ns(al) be given by equations (5.4.11) and (5.4.12), respectively. Stan-
dard calculations show that n`(a1) - nS(al) if and only if tl ~ t2 and furthermore
al satisfies
(a,)z - al ~ (t13t' ~2)2 - 0. (5.6.19)
Both n`(ai) and ne(cri) are increasing in a' if ti 1 t~, they are constant in a' if
tl - t2, and they are decreasing in al if t1 G t2. For (tl - t2)2 G 12tltz we have
n`(ai) 1 ns(al). For (tl - t2)2 ~ 12t1t2 equation (5.6.19) has two solutions, aL and
aH, where
aL - 2(1 - (1 - lttat~ziz)2)
al 1 1~- 1- t2Ptz 'zy - 2( ( ~ti-iz12) )~
It is easy to check that for (tl - tz)2 ~ 12t1t2 we have
n`(al) 1 n'(al) for al E[0, aL) U(ay, l]
n`(al) - ns(al) for al E{aL,aH}
n`(al) G ns(al) for al E(a~,aH).
So, for the generalized circular model where all firms are of the same type, there exist
parameter constellations for which the number of firms selected by the social planner
exceeds the number of firms under free entry, which gives the required result.
g4 A Generalized Circular Model
Proof of Theorem 5.5.3
First, consider the case of strong competition. Firm i E I maximizes
2 t' 2 t2p'~al `1 ~p~-p'~ ~az`1 }p~-ptlJ
with respect to its price p;, given price p~ of the other firm, under the condition that
pi } Pz tz
p~ 2 ~ 4
The unconstrained optimum is given by p;(p~) - 2 f 4(~, ~- az )-1
symmetry, we get the solution pi - p2 - p' - 2(a,
~- L2 )-1
The profit maximizing price p' under strong competition is given thu
Ps -
In case there is weak competition, firm i E I maximizes
p~Scrl (1} pi-pT l faz~2(P-p')~~l `2 t' I t2
with respect to its price p;, given price p~ of the other firm, under the condition that
pifpz ~t' ~~~ Pi-~pz ~t?.
2 4 2 4
z(~~ f~)-` if P? q f á(a~ -f- ~`~ )-i
p- 4 if p G 4 f 2( a;l f a2 )-' .





p 2 ( 4(1-a)t~ }2at~ )
lf ~ i t~ ( 2
2-a tt tat~ )
2 4(1-a)t~}2atpW - p - 4
2(ti ~ t~)-1(al } 4~) otherwise.
Finally, in case there is no competition, firm i E I maximizes
p~ Jai ~2(P-pti) 1 fcrz ~2(P-p~)~~l tl J t2
with respect to its price p;, under the condition that
pi -f- pz ti
PG 2 ~ 4-
5.6 Proofs
The solution for this problem is given by
P
PN - Z ti
~ - 4
if p G `'s
t'if p j ,
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In order to combine these three different cases, we need to investigate what hap-
pens at the corners.
For p- '2 2~`9 , it holds that 2 f p~t;p' - 2 Pt;p' for j~ i E 1. This means
that the solution under strong competition and the solution under weak competition
must then coincide. But then
t2 t2 2(1}a~)il}a't~ ;~ 1 a~ aZ -1
~~ - ~ - 4 fOr 2 ~ qa2;1 }2al t2 ~ C ~ C s ~ s ~ ;i } t-z ) ~
For p-' 2~-~ 4 we have a similar result. The solution under no competition and
the solution under weak competition must then coincide. This yields
t' for `' C C `~ ( Qa' P }sal `2





In this chapter, intermediation in bilateral matching markets is studied. Examples of
such markets are marriage markets, dating markets, temporary employment markets,
housing markets, stamp auctions. Typically, in these markets buyers and sellers of
the good are not able to trade directly, sometimes simply because they don't know
each other. Therefore trade occurs via some intermediary or middleman.
Essentially, we may distinguish between two different types of middlemen, namely
market makers and match makers (see Yavas (1992) for a comparison). Market makers
are actually involved in the trade process, in the sense that they buy commodities
from sellers, and resell them to buyers. For example, for a study of the role of market
makers see Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987) or Bhattacharya and Yavas (1993). Match
makers, however, are not involved in the trading process. They just make trade
possible by bringing buyers and sellers together. In this chapter we study a market
organized by match makers.
We analyze a variant of the Salop (1979) model of spatial competition where
two match makers compete in commission fees. In our model there are continuum
populations of buyers and sellers, uniformly distributed over a circular city, with
possibly different densities. Each seller owns one unit of an indivisible 'commodity',
which he desires to sell to one of the buyers and, moreover, each buyer desires to buy
one unit.
Buyers and sellers have to make use of the services of one of the two match makers
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in order to trade. If a buyer or seller goes to a match maker, he pays a commission fee
to the match maker, provided he is matched. Besides a commission fee, buyers and
sellers incur a relational cost by going to a match maker. This includes costs of effort,
search, transportation, etc. Furthermore, each buyer or seller has a reservation price,
indicating how much he is willing to spend, in terms of the fee plus the relational
cost, in order to be matched by a match maker.
The profits of the match makers are determined by their respective market sizes.
We implicitly assume that firms expect buyers and sellers to be naive, in the sense
that every buyer and seller is expected to go to the match maker whose sum of
fee and relational cost is the lowest. We do not try to include more sophisticated
expectations of the firms with respect to agents' behavior, because the firms have
no a priori information about the distribution of buyers and sellers over the match
makers. As one may argue, however, buyers' and sellers' beliefs about being matched
might influence their behavior. We do not consider this, because we want to focus on
the competition in commission fees. In other words the firms do not take into account
the risk for buyers and sellers of not being matchedl. In equilibrium, fees are such
that agents indeed cannot do better than acting naively, which yields a consistent
equilibrium path.
We show that, generically, there is a unique Nash equilibrium for the game in
which two match makers simultaneously choose fees in case of unequal densities,
whereas in case of equal densities uniqueness is only guaranteed as long as at least
one of the reservation prices is relatively low. In equilibrium, the fees are such that
per firm demand and supply are equalz.
Two interesting results follow from the model. First, the restriction on one side
of the market implies that for sufficiently high reservation prices, the long side of
the market can be 'exploited' completely by the middlemen. Since the short side
determines the profits of the middlemen entirely, it is not optimal for the firms to
compete for the agents on the long side. Hence, the firms' profits tend to infinity
if reservation prices become larger and larger. Second, the agents on the short side
of the market may entirely 'free ride', in the sense that they pay a zero commission
lIn some sense, this risk could be related to the risk associated with the timely delivery of products
(see Espinosa (1992)).
ZIt is often assumed in the literature, that either supply is not binding or the demand functions
are exogenous. In our model, the demand functions aze endogenous. The model can be seen as
a'strategic market coverage' type of model. Strategic market coverage through advertising was
considered by Boyer and Moreaux (1993).
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fee. In equilibrium, the middlemen actually desire to subsidize these agents. The
positive effect of the market size on profits is then dominating the negative effect of
fees on profits. For ease of exposition, we restrict ourselves to non-negative fees in
the first sections of the paper. The discussion of negative fees, i.e., match makers
providing subsidies, is postponed until Section 6. As a real-life example of match
makers subsidizing the short side of the market, one may think of dating agencies.
In case of equal densities, the asymmetry between the long and short side of
the market disappears completely. A large amount of equilibrium indeterminacy is
created for equal densities. For unequal densities, this problem does not occur, except
for a non-generic set of parameters. The case of equal densities itself is non-generic,
however, so that the indeterminacy does not cause too serious problems. The case of
equal densities is analyzed in order to provide a benchmark.
This chapter is based on van Raalte and Webers (1995) and is organized as follows.
In Section 2 the model is formulated. Section 3 states the Nash equilibria for the game
in which both match makers set fees simultaneously. Section 4 gives a characterization
of the difFerent Nash equilibria stated in Section 3. In Section 5, comparative statics
is performed of the cases of equal densities and unequal densities. Section 6 briefly
discusses the situation in which there are explicit subsidies. The proofs are gathered
in Section 7.
6.2 The model
There is a continuum of agents distributed uniformly with density c~' d- 0!2 along
a circle with perimeter one. Agents of type B E 0-{1,2} are distributed with
density ae along this circle. Agents of type 1 are willing to sell one unit of a homoge-
neous indivisible good and agents of type 2 are willing to buy one unit of this good.
Therefore, the agents of type 1 and the agents of type 2 of agents will sometimes be
referred to as sellers and buyers, respectively. Without loss of generality we assume
that 0 G a' G a2. In order to trade, the sellers and buyers need a third party, called
intermediaries, whose service it is to match sellers and buyers. These intermediaries
are referred to as firms. There are two firms, indexed i E I-{1, 2}. Firm i E I is lo-
cated along the circle at x; -`2' Both types of agents face identical linear relational
costs with unit cost t E 1R~~. Furthermore, agents of type B E 0 have reservation
price ~ E 1R~~ for the relational costs and fees charged by any of the two firms, i.e.,
they want to pay up to an amount ~ for the firms' services. The reservation prices
are assumed to be given exogenously. Firm i E I charges fee pB E [0, pe] to agents
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of type B E O, for providing this service. This means that firms are assumed not to
be able to provide subsidies. Let p; E P-[0, pr ] x[0, pz] denote the tuple of fees
G p; , p; 1 for firm i E 1. It may happen for an agent that the fee and the relational
cost are so high that the reservation price cannot cover these.
Definition 6.2.1 Forfirm i E I, the potential market area of agents of type B E O at
fee pB, denoted by MB(pB), is the set of locations of agents of type B, for which the sum
of the relational cost and the fee pB charged by firm i does not eaceed the reservation
price p .
More formally, MB(pe) -{x E [0, 1] ~ pB -{- tx G pe or pe ~- t(1 - x) G~} and
Mz(p2) -{~E[0,1] ~p2ft(z-~)G~ orp2 -~t,(x-z)G~ }for BE O. Notice
that for each firm both potential markets form an interval. The notion of potential
market areas is used to describe the structure of competition among the two firms.
We distinguish between three different situations.
Definition 6.2.2 At given fees, there is strong competition, at these fees, if the po-
tential market areas for the two firms have a non-empty intersection for both types
of agents. There is weak competition, at given fees, if the potential market areas for
the firm.s have a non-empty intersection for one of the two types of agents and for
the other type the intersection is either a point or empty. There is no competitíon,
at given fees, if the potential market areas of the firms have an intersection which is
either a point or empty for both types of agents.
For firm i E I, the size of the potential market area of agents of type B E 0 at
fee pa is the total length of the interval of agents of type 8 for which the sum of the
relational cost to firm i and the fee of firm i, po, does not exceed the reservation
price ~. For firm i E I, at fees pl and pzi the minimum of the sizes of the potential
market area and the competitive market area of agents of type B E O is denoted by
XB(pr,pz). The market size X;(pl, p2) for firm i E 1, at prices pl and pz, is equal to
mineEO Xo(Pi,Pz)
It is easy to verify that for both firms, the potential market areas of agents of type
B E O have a non-empty intersection in case pBz~ -~ q G~ and have an intersection
e e
which is either a point or empty in case p~2 ~- 4~~. This means that there are
four different regions under concern.~ ~ z z
For p2~f 4 1 pl and p~z f 4~ pz we have the situation of no competition.
The market size for firm i E 1 is given then by
X~(Pt,Pz) - min { ai
~2(Pl ~ P;
)~ az `2(Pz t P?)~ ~
. (6.2.1)
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For pl~z f 9 G p' and p2~z ~- q`- ) p~ we have the situation of weak competition,
where the firms compete for the sellers. The market size for firm i~ j E I is given
then by
X~(Pi,P2) - min 1 a~ ~~ ~




For p~z~-}- 4 1 p' and p22~-~q-̀ G p2 we have the situation of weak competition,
where the firms compete for the buyers. The market size for firm i~ j E I is given
then by
Xi(Pi,Pa) - min ( ai
~2(Pl ~ Pi)~
a2 `2 ~ p, t p?I ~.
(6.2.3)
Finally, for p~~~ ~ 4 G pl and p221 ~- q`- G p2 we have the situation of strong
competition. The market size for firm i~ j E I is given then by
X;(Pi,Ps) - min ( al r2 ~
P~ ~ Pi
~ a2 `2 ~ p, t p?~ ~.
(6.2.4)
Given the prices pl and p2, the profit of firm i E I is equal to
B;(Pi~Pz) - (P~ ~ P?)X,(Pi,Pz). (6.2.5)
Costs are assumed to be normalized to zero. We look for a Nash equilibrium for the
game in which the firms simultaneously choose prices as to maximize their profit.
The price game is solved by prices pi E P, pz E P satisfying
ni(Pi,P2) ~ Bi(Pi,P2)
ns(Pi,Pz) ~ Bz(Pi~P2)
for all p~ E 1~
for all p2 E 1~.
6.3 Nash equilibria
In the sequel, the game in which firms simultaneously choose fees is referred to as G.
In game G firm i E I chooses fees pe, B E 0, as to maximize its profit given the choice
of the other firm. Because firms are located symmetrically it makes sense to look for
equilibria in which both firms choose the same fees. Moreover for each firm demand
and supply must be equal in equilibrium. This is stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 6.3.1 At a Nash equilibriu~n (pi,p2) E P x P for the game G, derrcand and
supply are equal for each firm.
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Proof Suppose first that for some firm demand is greater than supply. Then increas-
ing the fee for the buyers increases profit because supply will not change. Suppose
next that demand is smaller than supply. Then increasing the fee for the sellers in-
creases profit. So demand must equal supply in equilibrium.
O
For the case al G a2 the equilibrium outcomes are given in Proposition 6.3.2 and
Proposition 6.3.3. In Section 4 we give an interpretation of these results.
Proposition 6.3.2 Suppose al G a2 and let pl and p~ be such that pl G a14á2 2 t
whenever p2 - 4~; . Then there eaists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium (pi, p2) E
P x~ for the game G given by pi - pz -G pl', p2` ~-
(2a1}az)y ~-azpz (a~}2az)PZ-a~Pl 1 2 G al}aZ t
G 2(a~}azl ~ 2(ai}azl ~ Zf p} p 2az ~
a2 -2 G 1 G a~ 2az 2
2a~}az p- p a~ p
G ~,PZ - á~ pl i zf pl C 2a }aa i~2~ pl C 4
1 az 2 2~ al 1 2 G a~t
G T~ - ái P i ~ J Zf P - a~}2az 1~ ~ 7~ qáz
G pl - q~ P2 - qa~ 1 Zf pl ~ q~ pz ~ qaz ,
a~}az t 1 2 2a1}3a2 t2~Z G p ~ p G~Z
al}a2 t 2 2 alt 1 2~ (2a~t3a2)tG~Z - i) , T) - 4az i 2f p~ p qaz ~
alt 2 al}az t
4a C p C 2az
2 aIt 2] al}az t t, t
G ~, p- 4az ~ Zf :~ 2a2 ~ p- 9.
Proof See Section 7.
Proposition 6.3.3 Suppose a' G a2 and let pl ) a14a2 2 t and p2 - 4á; . Then there
ezists a continuum of symmetric Nash equilibria (pi, p2) E P x P for the game G
characterized by pi - p2 -G cp,0 ~ with cp E [ a'q~22 t,p1 - 4].
Proof See Section 7.
For the case al G a2 the situation of strong competition does not occur in equi-
librium. The result for the case al G a2 is summarized in Theorem 6.3.4.
Theorem 6.3.4 Suppose al G a2. Then, generically, there exists a unique symmet-
ric Nash equilibrium for the game G.
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Proof See Propositions 6.3.2 and 6.3.3.
To be complete and to provide a benchmark we also give the symmetric Nash
equilibria in case the agents' densities are the same, i.e., a' - az. This requirement
complicates the proofs, because now the situation of strong competition can occur
in equilibrium, which gives rise to a lot of indeterminacies. Consequently there are
several ranges of reservation prices for which there exíst continua of equilibria. Again,
Section 4 provides an interpretation of these results.
Proposition 6.3.5 Suppose al - a2 and let pl -f- p2 c 2` in case pl ~`-,~ and;v2 ~`-,~.
Furthermore let ~ C 4` for P- 4, j~ i E I. Then there exísts a unique symmetric
Nash equilibrium (pi, p2) E P x P for the game G given by
~ 3-~~ 3-~ i4 ~ 4 if pl f p2 C t, ~ C p' C 3p2
C 0, p2 - pl 1 if pl C~, Pl ~ 4
G p' - p2, 0 1 if p1 1 3p2, p2 G 4
G pl -,~̀-, p2 - 4~ if t G pi ~ p2 G 2`, Pl ~ 4~ p2 ~,~̀-.
Proof See Section 7.
Proposition 6.3.6 Suppose al - a2 and let pl -F- p2 1 2`. Furthermore, let p' ~ 4
andp2 ~`-,~. Then there exists a continuum of symmetric Nash equilibria (pi, p2) E Px
Pfor the game G characterized 6y pi - p2 -G cp, t-c~ ~ with y~ E[0, pl -`-,~]fl[ 4` -p2, t].
Proof See Section 7.
Proposition 6.3.7 Suppose a' - a2. Let pl ) 9` and p2 ),~̀-, then there exists a
continuum of symmetric Nash equilibria (pi, p2) E P x P for the game G characterized
by pi - p2 -G cp,0 ~ with y~ E [t,pl - 4]. Let p2 1 4 and pl ~ `-,~, then there exists a
corztinuum of symmetric Nash equilibria (pi, p"2) E P x~ for the game G characterized
by pi - p2 -G 0, cp ~ with y~ E [t, p2 - 4].
Proof See Section 7.
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In Section 7 it is shown that the set of symmetric equilibria characterized in Propo-
sitions 6.3.5, 6.3.6 and 6.3.7 is exhaustive in case a' - a2. The result for the case
al - a2 is summarized in Theorem 6.3.8.
Theorem 6.3.8 Suppose al - az. Then there exists a unique symmetric Nash equi-
librium for the game G as long as at least one of the reservation prices is relatively
low. Otherwise there exists a continuum of symmetric Nash equilibria and possibly
there exist three di,f,}~erent continua of symmetric Nash equilibria.
Proof See Propositions 6.3.5, 6.3.6, 6.3.7.
6.4 Equilibrium characterization
In order to discuss the difFerent types of equilibria we label the different regions of
reservation prices in Propositions 6.3.2 and 6.3.3 as in Figure 6.1 and summarize the
results of the previous section. For the case al G a2 we refer to Table 6.1.
Area Fees Profits
I (2at}az)Pl-aZPZ ( a~}2a2)p2-a~P~G 1
ala2 1 2 2
~~ ~z(ai}az~ , g(ai}az~ y(a1}a2~t p p
IIa c-1 -~z 2 6 1p ~ P, 2~2 p2(p' - á~ pz)




1 t 2 a~t
G p - q~~ - 4a2 ~
a~}a~ t 2 2 alt
C 2ay - p i p - 4a2 ~
G O 2- alt i
~ p 4a~
a~ r 1 2 al}a~ tl
2 lp ~ p - 4a2 l
at(a~}2a2)f
Sa2
a ~ r 2- a~il
2 lp 4a2 l
Table 6.1: Equilibrium fees and profits for the different regions in case a' G a2.
We can distinguish three areas of no competition and three areas of weak competi-
tion. It is easily checked that the corresponding fees and profits change continuously
in and between the areas, except between the areas IIa and IVa where p2 - 4á; and1 ~ a~ }3a~ t
1J 4a~ .

















Figure 6.1: The different regions in case ar C a2
Areas I, Ila, llb: No competition.
In the areas 1, IIa, and Ilb, the reservation price of at least one of the types of
agents is so low that both firms establish 'local monopolies'. In area I, the differences
between the reservation prices of the sellers and buyers are suf6ciently low to obtain
an equilibrium with both fees positive. The fees are such that the agents with the
higher reservation price also pay a higher fee. This property also holds for the areas
IIa and II6, in which cases the difference between the reservation prices is relatively
high and the agents with the lower reservation price do not pay any fee. In these
two areas, the firms actually desire to subsidize the agents with the lower reservation
price. Since we restrict ourselves to non-negative fees, this means that these agents
are served for free. The willingness to subsidize the agents with the lowest reservation
fee comes from the market externality associated with matching. In order to make a
profit, both sellers and buyers are needed. For sufficiently different reservation prices,
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the positive effect of attracting more agents is stronger than the negative effect of
charging lower fees. Only the agents with the higher reservation price in that case
bring in a positive amount of money.
Areas III, IVa, IVb: Weak competition.
In areas III, IVa, and IV6, the reservation prices are both sufficiently high to create
a situation of weak competition. In area III, the situations of weak competition and
no competition coincide. In this area, the reservation prices are still sufficiently low
and close to each other to have both types of agents being treated 'symmetrically'.
The sellers located at a distance 4 from the firms have a zero surplus. A fraction
a2 - a1 of the buyers is not served. Firms do not try to capture these buyers, since
demand and supply must be equal in equilibrium.
In areas IVa and IVb, the symmetrical treatment between buyers and sellers
disappears. Now, the reservation prices are so high, that the sellers located at a
distance á from both firms claim a positive surplus. The sellers take advantage of
their position in the market, because they form the short side of the market. The
negative effect of charging lower fees is more than compensated by the positive effect
of attracting more sellers.
The advantageous market position of a seller in case of high reservation prices
is exercised maximally in area IVb. Similar to the area II6, the firms desire to
subsidize the sellers. This implies that the sellers are served for free. The profits in
IVb are increasing in the reservation fee of the buyers, with no upper bound. Since
competition on the long side of the market never occurs in equilibrium, the buyers
can be charged maximally.
From Proposition 6.3.3 we know that there exists a continuum of equilibria at the
intersection of areas IIa and IVa for pl ~ a~4a`~~ t. Equilibrium fees are G cp,0 )
and profits are 2~, with cp E[ alqá"2 `,p' - 4]. In equilibrium all buyers are served
for free and demand equals 2' per firm.
For the case ~' - a2 the equilibria can be distinguished by the areas 1, IIa, and II6
as before ( with al - a2) and the areas III, IVa, IV6, IV` as in Figures 6.2 and 6.3,
wíth corresponding fees and profits as in Table 6.2, where a- crt - a2. Note that
equilibrium prices are homogeneous of degree zero in a and that equilibrium profits
are homogeneous of degree one in a.3
3In case al C aZ equilibrium prices and equilibrium profits are homogeneous of degree zero and
degree one in al and aZ, respectively. However, because of symmetry in notation we prefer not to




3-Pl-F~ 3-P~-PI~ 4 i q 1
a 1 2 2
qt ~~ } p ~
Ila C p' - p2,0 ~ 2a p2(p' - p2)
II6 C O,p2 - p' 1 z~ P'~P2 - P')
III Cp'-`-,p2-t-14 4 ~~P'fP2-t)2 2
ÏVa ~~a, t - y~a ~ Zt
IVb G O,y~b i Zcpb
ÏV` ~ y~`,0 1 2~p`
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Table 6.2: Equilibrium fees and profits for the different regions in case c~l - a2 - a,
with cpa E[O,Pl - á~ n~4~ - P2,t~, 4~6 E~t,p2 - 4], and 4~` E ~t,Pl - q~.
The areas I, Ila, and II6 do not change with respect to the situation al ~~2,
since no competition occurs in equilibrium. The areas associated with competition
do change, however. No, weak and strong competition coincide in area III. For the
areas IVa,IVb, IV` we have strong competition.
Area IÍI.
In area III, the situations of no, weak and strong competition coincide. Although
III is shaped similarly as area III in Figure 6.1, it is larger, however. In order to get
strong competition, the reservation prices have to be larger. The reason is that in case
a1 G a2, the negative effect of charging lower fees under competition is dominated,
since only competition for sellers can occur in equilibrium. Firms can 'afford' lower
fees for the sellers already for lower reservation prices, since for buyers fees remain
monopolistic. In case a' - a2, the negative effect of charging lower fees occurs in
both market segments.
Areas ÏVn, IVb, ÏV`.
For the situation of strong competition, different types of continua of equilibria co-
exist. For reservation prices in area IVa, there is a continuum of equilibria where
the fees, with sum equal to t, can be divided in an arbitrary way. Exploitation of
one of the market sides does not occur in this equilibrium. Notice that also a'fair'
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treatment of agents, that ís, cp - 2, is allowed as an equilibrium. Exploitation of one
of the market sides comes back in the two other continua of equilibria for the areas
IV6 and IV`. In these areas equilibria exist in which one type of agents is served for
free and the other type is exploited completely. Equilibria in area IVa, in which case
there is an upper bound on the profits, thus may coexist with equilibria in area IVb
or area IV`, in which case there exist equilibria for which the profits tend to infinity











Figure 6.2: Different regions in case al - r7~.
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Figure 6.3: Regions IVb and IV~ in case ~1 - ct~.
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6.5 Comparative statics
In order to provide more insight in the differences and similarities between the case
a' G a2 and the (non-generic) case al - a2, we discuss equilibrium pricing and
equilibrium profits in more detail in this section. To use the standard circular model
outcome as a benchmark we consider the case p' - p2.
From Section 3 we know that in case a' G a2 and pl - pZ - p, the equilibrium
fees (pi, p'2) are given by pi - p2 -G pl', pz' ), where
G Pl~, pz~ ~-
at a2




~ 2az - p~ p- 4á J
C 0, p- 4a~ 1
a~}aZ t
if p C 4ay
~f (a~}a~)t G ~ (2a1}3a2)t
4~ p ga2
(2a~}3~ aZ ) i a~}a~ t




This result is drawn in Figure 6.4. Note that p2' is increasing in p, while p''









Figure 6.4: Equilibrium fees in case a' G a2.
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Furthermore we know from Section 3 that in case a' - a2 and pl - p2 - p
equilibrium fees ( pi, p2) are given by p~ - p2 -G pl`, p2" ,, where
~ p1W p2w ~-,
G 2, 2 1
GP-Q,P-4~
if p G 2
if 2 CpG 4`
G c,~, t- cp ~ if p 1 á`, with y~ E[0, p-,,̀-] n[ 4` - p, i]
G cp, 0 1 if p 1 4` , with cp E[t, p-,~̀-]
G 0, c~ 1 if p) ~, with cp E [t, p- 4].









Figure 6.5: Equilibrium fees in case al - a2.
The complication here is that there is a continuum of equilibria for p 1 4` and that
there are even three types of continua for p~ 4, which gives rise to a coordination
problem. Although our purpose is not to solve this coordination problem, there are
several reasons to favour the 'fair' solution G z, 2~ for p) 4`. First, the solution
for p G 4t is also fair. Second, the fair solution provides a lower bound on the firms'
profits which seems suitable from a social point of view. Third, the fair solution is
equal to the solution for the standard circular model.
Firms' profits when a2 - al - ál and ~2 - a2 ) al - i~l are drawn in Figure 6.6.
If the reservation price is relatively low, i.e., p C a~8a; ~`, we are in regions 1, III, IVa
in case al G a2, and in regions I and III in case al - a2. For p G ~lgàa2 `, profits
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are higher in case a' G a2 than in case a' - a2. In case a' G a2 the fees for the
sellers are lower and the fees for the buyers are higher than in case a' - a2. The
sum, however, is the same. This means that the higher profits in case a~ G az are
caused by an increase in market size. If the reservation price is relatively high, i.e.,
p) al9aa~ `, we are in region IVb in case a' G a2, and in regions IVa,IVb, IV~
in case a' - a2. For p~ a,q~q 2 t, profits are higher in case a' G a2 than in case
a' - a2. Equilibrium demand is the same in both cases. This means that the higher
profits in case a' G a2 are caused by an increase in the totalfee. If the reservation
~ ~ ~ z
price is intermediate, i.e., a say ` G p G a qá2 `, profits are higher in case a' - a2










I ~ 1 I I I I I~ i i 4 i ~ i i ~ ~ ~ i -~P
à~ à~ 1~ à~ 4à~ 3 ài à~ 5 1
4à 2 8à 4 2à~ , 4
2à1 3àZ àl 4à~
Sà2 4à2
Figure 6.6: Equilibrium profits when a2 - a' - á' and á2 - a2 ) a' - á'.
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6.6 Effects of subsidies
In order to discuss what happens if fees are allowed to be negative, we need to restate
the propositions from Section 3. The proofs are similar to those in Section 3 and
therefore are omitted in Section 7. Allowing for subsidies means that the tuple of
fees charged by any firm belongs to P~ -[-c, p'] x[-c, pz] for some c) 0. The
number c can be interpreted as the maximum amount of subsidy being allowed. In
case al G a2 the equilibrium outcomes are given in Propositions 6.6.1 and 6.6.2.
There is a shift in the different regions of reservation prices, but the structure of the
equilibrium outcomes remains unchanged.
Proposition 6.6.1 Suppose ~' G cr2 and let p' G(a'9áa2 t -~c for p2 - Qá; -c. Then
there exists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium (pi, p2) E P~ x P~ for the game G




i 2f 2 al}a2 C} p ~ 2a2 i
G-Ci p2 - as ill - a2 C ia
1 a2 2 a2GP -átP -~,c,-c1
1 t 2 a~t
G p - q~p - 4a2 i
al}a2 t 2 2 alt
G 2á2 - p ~ T) - 4áa i









a2 2 2 a~ }a2 c
2a~}a2 p - 2a~}a2 '
a~}2a2 2 2 a'}a2 c
at p ~ at
~ - Cq '
a2 2 2 al }a2 c
2a1}a2 p - 2at}a2
a~ 1 2 a~-~a2 c
a~ }2a2 p - a~ }2a2 '
2 alt
p ` 9a2 - C
2f p' ~ t- C p~ ? a~; - C,9 ' 4a
2f
if
a~}a2 t 1 2 2a1}3a2 t~Z C P ~}. ~ C q~1-
1 z (2a~}3a2)t
p ~ p ~ 4az ~
a~t - C
G-2 G a1}a2 t C
4a2 p 2a2 ~
2~ a~ }a2 t 1 1 Z- Cp Za2 -f- c, p q
Proposition 6.6.2 Suppose ai G~2 and let pl ~ a~4a2a2 t -~ c and p2 - q~ - c.
Then there esists a continuum of symmetric Nash equiliória (pi, p2) E P~ x ~~ for the
game G characterized by pi - p2 -G y~,0 ) with y~ E [ a~y~a2 t f c,pl - 4].
We see that the size of areas 1, III, and IVa increases in c, whereas the size of
areas IIa and IIb decreases in c. For area IV6 this is ambiguous. The short side of the
market is served at fee -c in the areas Ila, Ilb, and IVb instead of fee zero as before.
Note that there is a demand effect in the (local monopoly) areas IIa and II6 which
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causes the lower fee for the long side of the market compared to the situation c- 0.
Theorem 6.3.4 remains unchanged, however. So, generically, there exists a unique
symmetric Nash equilibrium. If c is relatively high, i.e., c 1~`, the local monopoly
areas IIa and IIb disappear as is drawn in Figure 6.7. In this case competition would
drive the fees so much down that profits become negative, which cannot occur in
equilibrium.
Pz






Figure 6.7: The different regions in case al C a2 and c) 4.
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In case ~1 - a2 the equilibrium outcomes are given in the following three propo-
sitions.
Proposition 6.6.3 Suppose al - c~2 and let pl f p2 C 2t in case pl 1 9- c and
p2 1 4- c. If furthermore ~ G 4t f c for p- 4- c, j ~ i E I, there exists
a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium (pi, p2) E P~ x~~ for the game G given by
pi - Pz -C
pi. p2. )-
C 3-P1 - P2 3-P2 -P1 ~4 ~ 9
G -C,p2 -p1 -C~
Gpl-p2-c,-c1
~ -1 t 2 t ]
p -4'p -4
2f pl -i- p2 G t, 3- 3` C p' C 3p2 ~ 4c
2 1~~- 4c 1~ t- C
f p 3 3' p 4
if p? 3p2 ~- 4c, pz C 4- c
if t G pl ~- pz G Zt, pl ~ 4- c, ~12 i 4 - C.
Proposition 6.6.4 Suppose ~1 - a2 and let pl ~ p2 ~ 2t. Furthermore let pl ~
4- c and p2 1 4- c. Then there exists a continuum of symmetric Nash equilibria
(pl,p2) E 1~~ x P~ for the game G characterized by pi - p2 -G cp,t - cp 1 with
c,~E [-c,pl-4]fl[4 -p2,tfc].
Proposition 6.6.5 Suppose al - a2. Let pl ~ 4~- c and p2 1 4- c, then there
exists a continuum of symmetric Nash equilibria (pi, p2) E Pc x~~ for the game G
characterized by pi - p2 -G y~, -c 1 with cp E [t f c,pl - 4]. Let p2 1 Qt ~-c and p' ~
9- c, then there exists a continuum of symmetric Nash equilibria (pi, p2) E P~ x P~
for the game G characterized by pi - p2 -G -c,cp ~ with cp E [t -~ c,p2 - 4].
As is easily seen there is again a shift in the different regions of reservation prices,
but the structure of the equilibrium outcomes remains unchanged once more. Also,
Theorem 6.3.8 remains unchanged. So, there exists a unique symmetric Nash equilib-
rium as long as at least one of the reservation prices is relatively low. Similarly as in
case al C cx2, the local monopoly areas IIa and II6 disappear if c is relatively high,
i.e., c ~ 4.
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6.7 Proofs
In order to prove the propositions we first specify the four relevant maximization
problems. In the region of fees where there is no competition firm i E I chooses fees
p; and p? that maximize
i z min(ni~2(Pl-P~)1 nz~2(Pz-P;)~~
(P; ~P;) l t J' t
subject to the constraints
~i ~ n'~PZ~ ~ 0 ~pi ~~i
z a~ t
P2 ~py~}q, ~~P?~P2.
In the region of fees where there is weak competition and the firms compete for
sellers, firm i E I chooses fees p; and p? that maximize
(Pi } P?) min ( al (~ ~
P~ i P~ 1 az ~2(Pz ~
P?)~ ~
(6.7.7)
subject to the constraints
Pl ~p122fá, OCP~ CPl
pz c p~i~ ~- 4, 0 G p? G pz.
In the region of fees where there is weak competition and the firms compete for
buyers, firm i E I chooses fees p; and p? that maximize
i z 1 i~2(P~ -Pi)~
z`1 p; -p?~~
(P; fP;)minla t 'a 2} t
(6.7.6)
(6.7.8)
subject to the constraints
In the regions of fees
and p? that maximize
P' C p~2p~`f 4, O~Pi CP'
pz ~ P~~1 ~ 4, 0 C p? C pz.
where there is strong competition firm i E I chooses fees p;
(P;~P;)mzn a 2} t 'a 2~ t
r z
.~ I`I p; -Pi~ z`I pj -p?~~
subject to the constraints




Proof of Proposition 6.3.2
First consider the situation of no competition. Because demand and supply have to
be equal in equilibrium, we can substitute p; - pz - áZ p] ~ á; p; into maximization
problem (6.7.6) for i E I. Note that one of the constraints becomes redundant. If we
denote the vector of Lagrange multipliers by ~; E Rt, the corresponding Lagrangian
1 a~ az 1 2 a~ 1 1 1 1 1for firm i E I reads ,Ci(pi, ~i) - az Pi ~ P - IXz P~(2(P - pi )) -~i](2p - p] -
1 t a~ 1 2 al 1 2 t 1 1 1 1 az 2 1
i12-2~-í,i2(áz ~ }~ -az pi -pj-2)-~i3(-Pi)-~iq(i~i -p )-~is(~ -a.i ~ -pi)
with j~ i E I. Firm i E I thus wants to maximize Gi(p;, ~;) with respect to p; E R~
and .~; E R~. The first order conditions for profit maximization for firm i E I can be
written then as
2 ( zaáz az l ~1 - 2pz - 4 I a~azaz ) pi } ~il ~ ~z Ái2 ~ ~i3 - ~iq ~ ~i5 - ~
~i] (2p1 -JPi - p2 - 2 ) -` 6
al 1 2 al 1 2 t
~iz(áz P ~p - áz pi - p~ - 2) - 0
~i3(-pi ) - ()
` 1 1
niq(Pi - P ) - 0
` z
ni5(p] - al pz - pi )- ~
(2P1 - pi - Pi - z) C 0
a~ 1 2 al 1 2 t(ázp ~p -ázpi-p~-2)C~
(-p;)GO
(pi - p]) G 0
(i~] - ái pz - pi ) C ~
~;t 1 0,1 E { 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.
Due to symmetry the first order conditions are solved by p; -G p]',pz' ) for
i E I, with G p]`, pz' )-
~ (zal}az)P~-azPZ (a~fzaz)Pz-a~Pl
i If2(attaz) ' 2(altaz)
C ~, i~z -"-z p] ia
1 az 2Cp -~~ p,0~
1 t 2 a~t
C p - q i i) - 9az i
1 2 at }az t
p ~ p C 2a2 i
az 2 1 a~ 2az 2
2ai}az p C p C a~ p
1 az 2 1 t
p C za~}az p~ p C 4
i i
pz ~ a~ }za2 p] ~ i~z C qaz
1 2 a~faz t 1 t
p~ p ~ 2az i p ~ q~




The last thing we have to do is to check whether or not (any of) these solutions
can be improved upon. For all the solutions it holds that deviating by setting a higher
fee for the sellers (and consequently also for the buyers) decreases profit. The more
interesting situation is deviating by setting a lower fee for the sellers, which of course
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cannot occur in case the other firm charges fees G 0, pz -~ pl 1. If the other firm
charges G p' - á, pz, 0~, deviating by setting a lower fee for the sellers decreases
profit, because demand cannot increase. If the other firm charges G p' - 4, pz -
4~ 1, deviating by setting a lower fee for the sellers decreases profit as long as pl }
z 2a'}3a2 t (za'}a2)p'-a2p2 (a~}za~)pZ-atplp G 4~Z. Finally, if the other firm charges G z(a,ta2) , z(a,~a~) ~,
deviating by setting a lower fee for the sellers decreases profit. For the solution
p~ - p2 -G pl - 4,pz - 4a; ~ we thus have to impose the additional requirement
that p' ~ pz G (za'tza~)t.4a
Next, consider the situation of weak competition. Because demand and supply
have to be equal in equilibrium, we can substitute pz - z~ (p~ - p; ~ 2~ for p? into
maximization problem (6.7.7) for j~ i E I. We need not consider maximization
problem (6.7.8) because al G az. If we denote the vector of Lagrange multipli-
ers by ~; E 1R}, the corresponding Lagrangian for firm i E 1 reads ,C;(p;, a;) -
~ a~zaa~ p~ - za~p~ ~ Pz - q~~ (p~ -p~ f 2) - ~ii (Pi ~ Pá ~ z - 2pi) - ~iz(2pz - t f za~ -
2P~ ~ ás (P~ - P~ )) - ~is(-Pi ) - ~i4 (P[ -Pl ) - ~is(P~ f 2 - záZ Pz - Pi ) - ~is(P; - P~ - 2 )-
Firm i E I thus wants to maximize G;(p;,.~;) with respect to p; E}fi.~ and .~; E 1R.~.
The first order conditions for profit maximization for firm i E I can be written then
as
2 a' 2a~ 1 a' a~ 1 t -~, al ~, ~. ~, ~. -~. - O
-P - á-Pi } ~(P~ ~ 2 ) ii ~ á~ iz ~ is - ~4 ~- ,s is
~ii(Pi } Pz f 2- 2P1) - 0
~iz(2pz - i -~ záz - 2p~ ~- ás (P; - P~ )) - 0
ni3(-Pi ) - O
1 1~i4(Pi - P ) - 0
~is(P;f2-zá2 Pz-Pi)-0
i i t
~is(Pi - p~ - 2) - 0
(Pi ~ Pi ~ 2- 2P
1) ~ ~
(2pz-tf2á~-2p~f~z(P~-P;))CO
(-P; ) c 0
(P~-p')CO
(P;f2-zQ2Pz-P~)CO
(P; -p~ -2) CO
a;~ ? 0,1 E {1,2,3,4,5,6}.
Due to symmetry the first order conditions are solved by p; -G pl", pz` ~ for
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i E I, with G pl',p2" )-
G O 2- a't ~
' p 4az
atta2 t 2 2 a't
G 2az - T~ ' p - 9a~ 1
1 t 2 att
G p - qip - 4a2 i
y~ a~ta~ t 1~ t
P 2~~ ~ P 4
1 2] (2at}3a2)t aIt G 2 G a~}a2 t
it ~ i~ qas i qas p 2a2
1~ p G(2a1}3a~)t 1~ t 2~ att





Finally we have to check whether or not ( any of) these solutions can be improved
upon. As before we have to impose the additional requirement that p' ~-p2 ] a2a2~ `
for the solution G pl - 4,pz - Qa2 ~. -
Because a1 G a2, the situation of strong competition cannot occur. Combining these
results yields Proposition 6.3.2.
Proof of Proposition 6.3.3
For p2 - a'Z and pl , a'taaz ` let the other firm's strategy be given by G y~, 0)4a 4a
with y~ E[ a~áa~2 `,p' -`-4]. Deviating by setting a lower fee for the sellers cannot
increase profit, because the fee for the buyers is zero. Deviating by setting a little
higher fee for the sellers, say pl - cp f 0 with 0 G ~ G ~' - 2p1 - 2- 2y~, and
consequently setting the highest possible fee for the buyers, i.e., p2 - p2 - Z~Z ( 2- 0),
results in profit equal to a' (cp -~ p2 ~ a~2 ~a2 0- Qá; )( 2- o ) which is maximal
for 0- 0 because y~ f p2 ) a zaa2 `. Deviating by setting a higher fee for the
sellers, i.e., pl - cp f 0 and p2 - p2 ~ á; ( y~ -~ 0- pl ) where 0~ 0' results
in profit equal to 2a' (cp -~ 0~ p2 -~ á2 (y~ ~ 0 - pi))(p' - y~ - ~), which is never
optimal. The reason is that the derivative of this profit with respect to 0 is equal to
pl - p2 - 2y~ - 20 -}- 2at(pl - y~ - ~), being negative at any 0~ 0'.
Proof of Proposition 6.3.5
For al - a2 the solution to the situation of no competition is the same as for a1 G
a2. The only difference with the first part of the proof of Proposition 6.3.2 is that
the solution p~ - pz - G pl - 4,p2 - á] cannot be improved upon for a larger
range of reservation prices, i.e., for all reservation prices satisfying p' -~ p2 G 2t. If
the other firm charges fees G p1 - q`-, p2 - á~, deviating by setting lower fees, say
G p1-4-0,p2-4-0 ) for some ~ ) 0, yields profit equal to (pl-~pz-2 -20)(2-}-0).
The derivative of this profit with respect to 0 is equal to p'~p2- 2t -30. So deviating
is not optimal as long as pl f p2 G á
If the other firm charges fees G pl - 4 ,p2 -,~̀- ), deviating by setting higher
fees, say G p' - 4~ 0, p2 - q`- } 0 ~ for some 0) 0, yields profit equal to (pl -~
p2 - 2 f 20)(2 - 2~). The derivative of this profit with respect to 0 is equal to
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2t - 2p1 - 2pz - 40. This means that deviating by setting higher fees is not optimal
as long as pl ~ pz ~ t.
Proof of Proposition 6.3.6 and Proposition 6.3.7
Consider the situation of strong competition. Because demand and supply have to be
equal in equilibrium, we can substitute p? - p~ f p; - p~ into maximization problem
(6.7.9) for j ~ i E I. If we denote the vector of Lagrange multipliers by a; E)Ei.~, the
corresponding Lagrangian for firm i E 1 reads ,C;(p;, ~;) -(2p; f p~ - p~)(p~ - p; -1-
2) - ~ii(-P; ) - ~iz(Pti -~t) - ~is(P~ -P~ -Pi ) - ~ia(P; ~P~ -P~ -Pz) - ~is(Pi ~ Pz f z -
2p' )-~;s(2p~ ~- p; - p~ f 2- 2pz). The first order conditions for profit maximization
for firm i E I can be written then as
3p~-p~-4p; ft fai~-~izf~is-~ia-~is-~is-0
~ii(-Pi ) - 0
~ ~~iz(Pi - P ) - 0
~i3(Pj - Pj - Pi ) - ~
~ia(Pi ~ P; - p~ - Pz) - 0
~is(Pi f Pz ~ 2- 2P1) - 0
~is(2P; f P~ - p~ ~ 2 - 2pz) - 0
(-P; ) G 0
(P; - pl) c 0
~ z i)CO(Pj - Pj - Pi
i z i z(Pi f Pj - Pj - P)~ 0
(Pi f P2 } 2- 2P1) C 0
(2p~ f p; - p~ f 2- 2pz) G O
~;~ 1 O,l E {1,2,3,4,5,6}.
Due to symmetry the first order conditions are solved by p; -G pl', pz' ~ for
i E 1, with
G cp, t- cp ~ for
G pi. pz. ~- G 0, cP ~ for




tG(Q~ pl-4, p2 ~ 4
Pl f pz C 2`, Pl ? á, Pz ? 9.
The last thing we have to do is to check whether or not (any of) these solutions
can be improved upon. Recall that any solution pi - p2 -G p, v 1 to (6.7.9) satisfies
0 G p G pi - 4 and 0 G v G pz - 4. First consider the situation where 0 C p G p' - 4
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and 0 G v G p2 - 9. If a firm deviates by setting slightly lower fees, say ~c - 0 and
v- ~ for some 0~ 0, profit equals (~ } v - 20)(2 -~ 0). The derivative of this
profit with respect to 0 is equal to p~- v- t- 40, so deviating by setting lower
fees is not optimal as long as ~~ v G t. Similarly we find that deviating by setting
higher fees is not optimal as long as ~~ v~ t. Combining these results gives that
~ f v- t. If fees increase more, the situation of no competition occurs. This requires
that 0 1 0' - 2p~ - 2 - 2tc. Profit is equal then to 2(2g -{- p2 - pl - 20)(p1 -~- 0).
One can check that the derivative of this profit is negative at 0', so deviating to the
situation of no competition is not optimal. Next consider the situation where one
of the two fees is zero. Then we need only to consider deviations by setting higher
fees. As shown before this means that g-}- v~ t. Note that the situation where
both fees are zero cannot occur. Finally consider the situation where tc - p' -,~̀- and
(consequently) v- p2 - 4. As shown in Proposition 6.3.5, this can be an equilibrium
as long as tG pl-hp2 G 2`.
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Samenvatting
Het doel van de niet-codperatieve speltheorie is het beschrijven van conflictsituaties
tussen partijen waarbij het maken van bindende afspraken niet mogelijk is. Deze mo-
delstructuur is makkelijk hanteerbaar en wordt steeds vaker gebruikt ter formulering
van economische problemen. In een niet-codperatief spel probeert elk van de partijen
middels het maken van keuzes een voor haar optimaal resultaat te behalen. Hierbij
wordt verondersteld dat geen van de partijen een directe invloed heeft op de keuze van
ieder ander. De uitkomst waarbij alle partijen tegelijkertijd zo'n optimale keuze maken
en derhalve geen van de partijen, gegeven de keuzes van de anderen, beter wordt door
het maken van een andere keuze, is de meest gebruikte evenwichtsoplossing. De
bestudering van zulke situaties, mits ze bestaan en bij voorkeur uniek zijn, geeft
inzicht in de invloed van de conflictsituatie op het functioneren van de partijen alsook
in de macht van elk van de partijen in het oplossen van de conflictsituatie.
Het locatie-model is een typisch voorbeeld van een economische conflictsituatie.
Veronderstel dat er in een economie een eindig aantal bedrijven actief zijn, die vanuit
verschillende locaties consumenten bedienen. Vanwege kosten voor al dan niet fysiek
transport wordt de prijs die een consument betaalt mede bepaald door de afstand
tot elk van de bedrijven. De bedrijven, die allen winstmaximalisatie als doelstelling
hebben, zullen middels hun prijskeuze trachten deze doelstelling te realiseren. Een
hogere prijs ten opzichte van omringende bedrijven geeft een hogere winstmarge, maar
bijgevolg ook minder vraag. Een lagere prijs ten opzichte van de omringende bedrij-
ven geeft een lagere winstmarge, maar meer vraag. Het is duidelijk dat hoewel de
beschrijving van zulke conflictsituaties vrij makkelijk is, de bepaling van bijbehorende
evenwichtsoplossingen vrij snel moeilijk en vaak zelfs onmogelijk is.
Naast het prijszettingsvraagstuk, dat inzicht geeft in de invloed van de conflict-
situatie op het functioneren van de bedrijven, moet ook het locatievraagstuk zelf niet
onbeantwoord blijven. Het antwoord op de vraag welke locaties de bedrijven zullen
kiezen, rekening houdend met de resulterende prijscompetitie erna, geeft namelijk
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inzicht in de macht van de bedrijven in deze conflictsituatie.
De beschrijving van de locatie- en prijskeuzes van bedrijven gebeurt middels een
twee-fasen locatie-dan-prijs spel. In de eerste fase kiezen de bedrijven hun locaties, die
alle andere bedrijven aan het eind van die fase kunnen waarnemen. Vervolgens kiezen
de bedrijven, gegeven deze locaties, in de tweede fase hun prijzen. Voor zo'n twee-
fasen spel onderzoeken we het bestaan van oplossingen zodanig dat de locatiekeuzes
voor alle bedrijven optimaal zijn gegeven de prijskeuzes in de tweede fase, en, dat
de prijskeuzes optimaal zijn bij alle mogelijke locaties. Deze oplossingen zijn de
zogenaamde deelspel-perfecte evenwichten.
De modellen die besproken worden in deze monografie hebben allen dezelfde
speltheoretische structuur, maar kunnen niettemin heel goed afzonderlijk bekeken
worden. Elk van de modellen, die min of ineer gezien kunnen worden als uitbreidin-
gen van bestaande modellen, behandelt het prijszettingsvraagstuk. Enkele modellen
behandelen ook het locatievraagstuk en de daarmee gepaard gaande mate van hori-
zontale differentiatie.
De bestaande modellen kunnen worden onderverdeeld in lineaire en cirkelvormige
modellen, waarbij consumenten zich met uniforme dichtheid respectievelijk langs een
lineair lijnsegment danwel langs een cirkel bevinden. Voor wat betreft het lineaire
model worden een drietal uitbreidingen gegeven, waarbij ook het locatievraagstuk aan
bod komt.
Allereerst wordt gekeken naar het effect van de introductie van een eindige be-
taalbereidheid voor consumenten in een situatie met twee bedrijven. We zien een
situatie van locale monopolies ontstaan als de betaalbereidheid relatief laag is. Elk
van de bedrijven kan zich dan als monopolist gedragen, omdat de consumenten ef-
fectief geen keuze hebben tussen de bedrijven. Als de betaalbereidheid relatief hoog
is, is er sprake van competitie, omdat alle consumenten dan kunnen kiezen tussen de
twee bedrijven. In evenwicht blijkt de mate van differentiatie niet-afnemend te zijn in
de betaalbereidheid. De bedrijven zullen echter nooit dezelfde locaties kiezen, omdat
competitie de winsten dan teveel naar beneden drukt.
Vervolgens wordt gekeken naar het effect van veranderingen in de verdeling van
consumenten langs het interval. Er wordt een stuksgewijs uniforme verdeling ver-
ondersteld, zo mogelijk ter benadering van een willekeurige verdeling. Bijgevolg maxi-
maliseren de twee bedrijven hun verwachte winst. We introduceren het psychologisch
evenwicht voor dit type spel en laten zien dat beide bedrijven evenveel vraag hebben
in evenwicht. Voor evenwicht wordt vereist dat de verwachtingen consistent zijn, ofwel
dat de verwachte winsten gelijk zijn aan de gerealiseerde winsten. Omdat de bedrijven
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in evenwicht dezelfde winst hebben, treedt er achteraf geen codrdinatie-probleem op.
In de laatste uitbreiding van het lineaire model wordt gekeken naar de gevolgen
van herhaalde prijscompetitie op de mate van differentiatie. Middels de introductie
van waarderingen per periode voor, zeg de kwaliteit van, produkten door consumenten
kunnen eenvoudig veranderende marktomstandigheden geïntroduceerd worden in het
model. In geval de marktomstandigheden niet veranderen, zullen de locatiekeuzes
niet verschillen ten opzichte van de situatie zonder herhaalde prijscompetitie. In het
algemeen echter zullen de bedrijven hun locatiekeuzes aanpassen en een locatie kiezen
tussen de per-periode optimale locaties.
Voor wat betreft het cirkelvormige model worden een tweetal uitbreidingen gegeven.
In beide modellen zijn er twee typen consumenten.
In het eerste geval zijn de twee typen consumenten verticaal gedifferentieerd,
wederom middels waarderingen voor de produkten, óf hebben de consumenten een
eindige betaalbereidheid. In geval de twee typen consumenten verschillende kosten
voor transport hebben, zien we dat het sociale optimum mogelijk meer bedrijven eist
dan het aantal dat de markt genereert. De verklaring hiervoor is gelegen in het feit
dat in geval van twee typen consumenten met verschillende transportkosten, de prij-
zen in evenwicht van boven begrensd zijn, waardoor ook het aantal bedrijven dat op
de markt toe zal treden van boven begrensd is.
In het tweede en laatste geval heeft elk van de typen consumenten een eindige
betaalbereidheid, die mogelijk verschilt per type. Het cirkelvormige model wordt hier
gebruikt om een matching markt te beschrijven. De bedrijven zijn hier instituties
die de twee marktzijden, zeg kopers en verkopers, bij elkaar brengen. De bedrijven
rekenen commissies voor het verlenen van deze service. De commissies die de bedrijven
aan elk van de marktzijden rekenen zijn in evenwicht zodanig dat vraag en aanbod aan
elkaar gelijk zijn. In geval er meer kopers dan verkopers zijn, is de commissie voor de
eersten hoger, en, in geval er minder kopers dan verkopers zijn, is de commissie voor
de laatsten hoger. Vanwege de prijscompetitie tussen de bedrijven is het mogelijk
dat één van de marktzijden gratis gebruik maakt van de service, waarvoor de andere
marktzijde dan feitelijk betaalt.
De uitbreidingen die besproken worden in deze monografie moeten gezien worden
als een complementaire beschrijving van een gedifferentieerde goederenmarkt waarin
zowel prijscompetitie als niet-prijscompetitie optreden. Gezien de specifieke eigen-
schappen van het onderliggende model zijn de verkregen kwalitatieve inzichten zoals
mate van differentiatie en relatief prijsniveau het meest van belang.
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